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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you enter a public park and a theater troupe is 
performing a version of The Passion of the Christl in the center 
square. There are a number of signs nearby advertising various 
products and services, and there are several street artists 
performing near the theater troupe. Depending upon your 
background, you may either find the story consistent with your 
religious beliefs, be ambivalent, or be offended. In any event, you 
know what the play is about. Is your understanding of the religious 
significance of the play altered by the presence of the 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. The 
author would like to thank Bill Blatt, Donna Chirico, Elizabeth Dale, Step 
Feldman, Rick Garnett, Steven Goldberg, Jessie Hill, Noga Morag-Levine, 
Robin Malloy, Kevin Saunders, Cynthia Starnes, and Glen Staszewski for their 
helpful comments. I am also grateful for helpful comments I received from the 
faculty at Penn State Dickinson School of Law, where I presented a faculty 
workshop, and from fellow panelists and audience members at the Association 
for Law, Culture, and Humanities Conferences at the University of Connecticut 
College of Law and the University of Texas, the Association for the Sociology of 
Religion Annual Meeting, and the Central States Law Schools Association 
Annual Meeting. Thanks also to Sarah Belzer, Kyle Reynolds, and Elijah Milne 
for excellent research assistance. Of course, any errors are mine alone. 
1. PASSION OF THE CHRIST (NEWMARKET FILMS 2004). 
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advertisements and the street performers? 
Now imagine that instead of a play, there is a large nativity 
scene, cross, menorah, or Ten Commandments monument, and that 
instead of being in a public park, you are on the lawn, courtyard, or 
entrance of a municipal building or state capitol. Courts have 
repeatedly struggled with issues raised when the government 
displays religious objects and symbols or when such objects are 
displayed by others on government property. Cases have involved 
objects such as Ten Commandments displays,2 creches (nativity 
scenes),3 Latin crosses,4 menorahs,5 and Christmas trees.6 The 
2. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2739 (2005) (striking 
down courthouse displays, including Ten Commandments, where displays were 
created as a means to post the Commandments in the courthouses); Van Orden 
v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (plurality opinion) (upholding display of 
Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 
1961 on the land between the Texas State Capitol and the state supreme court 
building); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1981) (per curiam) (striking 
down a Kentucky statute that required the posting of the Ten Commandments 
on each public school classroom in the state); see also King v. Richmond County, 
331 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding the use of a small seal that 
included a depiction of the Ten Commandments, but not the text, along with 
other images); Freethought Soc'y of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester County, 
334 F.3d 247, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding the display of a small Ten 
Commandments plaque on the old entrance to the county courthouse, where the 
plaque was placed on the building in 1920, and the old entrance where the 
plaque was located was no longer in use); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 
1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (striking down the display of a large granite Ten 
Commandments monument placed in the rotunda of the Alabama state 
courthouse in the middle of the night by the former Chief Justice of the 
Alabama Supreme Court); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 490 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(striking down the display of a monument donated by the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles in 1961 on the grounds of the state capitol); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 
F.3d 292, 307 (7th Cir. 2000) (striking down the display of a monument donated 
by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1958 and located on grounds of the city's 
municipal building). 
3. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) 
(striking down the display of a creche that was not part of a broader display on 
the Grand Staircase of the courthouse); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984) (upholding the city of Pawtucket's display of a creche as part of a broader 
seasonal display). 
4. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 
753, 770 (1995) (upholding the display of a Latin cross by the Ku Klux Klan on 
the grounds of the state capitol because the cross was displayed in a public 
forum open to all kinds of speech); Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City 
of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (striking down a fifty-
one foot Latin cross that was erected in the Eugene city park and was 
designated a war memorial after the court struck down its display in an earlier 
decision); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993) (striking 
down the display of two large Latin crosses in separate public parks and the use 
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results in these cases, especially in cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court, have been the subject of a great deal of 
criticism.7 The criticism has often focused either on the 
desacrilization of religious objects or on the failure to evaluate the 
impact that such objects have on religious outsiders.s This Article 
asserts that courts and their critics have generally overlooked or 
undervalued the significance of treating religious objects as legal 
subjects in the first place. 
Religious objects and religious symbolism generally do not lend 
themselves well to analysis under any of the legal tests developed by 
the Supreme Court,9 but, of course, courts do not have the luxury of 
ignoring issues related to religious symbolism when such issues are 
appropriately raised by parties. Nor should they.lO Both the courts 
of a Latin cross in the city's official insignia under the no preference clause of 
the California Constitution). 
5. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (upholding the display of a 
menorah, a large Christmas tree, and a sign saluting liberty at the Allegheny 
city-county building). 
6. Id. 
7. See infra Part IV (discussing this criticism and breaking it down into 
four broad critiques of the Court's religious symbolism jurisprudence). 
8. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and 
Religious Equality: Justice O'Connor's Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 837, 856-58 (2001) (criticizing the 
Court's minimization of the impact that government displays of religious objects 
can have on religious minorities); Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, The 
Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 lIARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
503, 504 (1992) (criticizing the Court's minimization of the impact government 
display of religious objects can have on religious minorities); Laura 
Underkuffier-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A 
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARy L. REV. 
837, 870-72, 971-72 (1995) (criticizing the Court's desacrilization of religious 
symbols); Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: 
Toward a First Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARy L. REV. 2261, 2299-
300 (2004) (criticizing the Court's desacrilization of religious symbols). 
9. Justice Breyer recently made this point in regard to what he called 
"borderline" cases involving religious objects. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 
2854, 2869 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). This Article suggests that none of 
the current legal tests are up to the task of adequately addressing the 
constitutionality of religious objects, but courts must address these objects 
nonetheless. 
10. There have been several attempts to take Establishment Clause issues 
away from the federal courts by limiting the courts' jurisdiction over cases 
involving such issues. See, e.g., We The People Act, H.R. 3893, 108th Congo 
§ 3.1(A) (2004) (attempting to remove federal court jurisdiction-including 
Supreme Court jurisdiction-to hear "any claim involving the laws, regulations, 
or policies of any State or unit of local government relating to the free exercise 
or establishment of religion"); Religious Liberties Restoration Act, S. 1558, 
108th Congo § 3 (2003) (attempting to remove lower federal court jurisdiction to 
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and their critics would face an easier and more fruitful task if they 
more carefully considered the objects addressed in religious 
symbolism cases. 
This task involves significant interpretive difficulties. ll When a 
court evaluates a case involving religious objects, it must subject 
those objects to the prevailing legal rules, norms, and analyses. It 
thus makes them legal subjects. 12 This creates interpretive 
problems because of the potentially varied symbolic meanings of 
many religious objects and the varying messages such objects can 
hold for different groupS.I3 It also raises questions regarding the 
nature of "religious objects," since many symbolism cases involve 
objects that courts suggest exude varying levels of religiosity 
depending on their context/4 and which some critics suggest mayor 
may not be perceived as religious depending on the perceiver's 
interpretive presumptions.1s 
Thus, religious symbolism cases raise questions that implicate 
semiotics and hermeneutics. The symbolic meaning of the objects 
hear cases involving the display of the Ten Commandments, the use of the word 
"God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, and the motto "In God We Trust"). This 
Article suggests that such attempts are inadvisable because of the mischief that 
could be created if the government were given free reign to use powerful 
religious objects without any judicial oversight. See infra Parts II, V 
(suggesting that religious objects are powerful symbols for believers and that 
these symbols are sometimes used by government entities to facilitate a given 
religion or religions). 
11. The interpretive concerns raise questions implicating semiotics and 
hermeneutics. Janet L. Dolgin, Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a 
National "Religion," 39 MERCER L. REV. 495, 497-98 (1988); Joel S. Jacobs, 
Endorsement as "Adoptive Action": A Suggested Definition of, and an Argument 
for, Justice O'Connor's Establishment Clause Test, 22 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 29, 
42-43 (1994); James B. Raskin, Polling Establishment: Judicial Review, 
Democracy, and the Endorsement Theory of the Establishment Clause, 60 MD. L. 
REV. 761, 770 (2001); Zick, supra note 8, at 2292-97,2308-11,2365-74. 
12. I am grateful to Robin Malloy for using this terminology during a 
conversation we had about this project when we were planning a panel on 
semiotics and law for the 2004 Law, Culture and Humanities meeting. 
13. Dolgin, supra note 11, at 497-98; William P. Marshall, "We Know It 
When We See It": The Supreme Court Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 533-
34 (1985-1986). 
14. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-602 (1989) 
(suggesting that the physical context of a display can affect its religious 
message for constitutional purposes); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676-77 
(1984) (also suggesting that the context of a display can affect its religious 
message). 
15. For example, Dolgin suggests that a secularized citizen who identifies 
as Christian but is not practicing may not perceive a creche as a religious 
object. Dolgin, supra note 11, at 504. Some of the material set forth later in 
this Article calls aspects of this criticism into question. See infra Parts II, V. 
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must be determined and analyzed within an interpretive framework 
where judges' preconceptions interact with the objects being 
interpreted. 16 Unfortunately, the semiotic and hermeneutic 
concerns have been addressed by courts in a reflexive way.17 This 
has led to a general failure to explore adequately the power of 
religious objects and a strong tendency to characterize them in a 
manner that reinforces a secularized, yet majoritarian, view of 
religion in public life. Is Ironically, the United States Supreme Court 
has led the way in creating this interpretive morass. I9 The Court's 
recent decisions involving Ten Commandments displays do little to 
solve this problem and may create additional questions.20 
The Court has tended to focus on the message sent to observers 
by religious objects.21 This is a problematic undertaking, however, 
since the Court has failed to adequately consider the objects 
"carrying" the message. The Court's approach to religious objects is 
akin to evaluating a text based on the message it conveys to readers 
16. Gadamerian hermeneutics (the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans 
George Gadamer) provide an excellent framework for understanding this 
process. For more on philosophical hermeneutics, there are a number of useful 
primary and secondary texts. Perhaps most important is Gadamer's magnum 
opus, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 
Continuum, 2d rev. ed. 1989). See also HANS-GEORGE GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL 
HERMENEUTICS (David E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976); HANS-GEORGE GADAMER, 
REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 1981). In 
addition to Gadamer's work, there are a number of good books that can serve as 
introductions to the subject. See, e.g., JOSEF BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY 
HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS AS METHOD, PHILOSOPHY AND CRITIQUE (1980); 
JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (Joel 
Weinsheimer trans., 1994). Examples of sources addressing legal hermeneutics 
include LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE (Gregory Leyh 
ed., 1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., GadamerlStatutory Interpretation, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990); Francis J. Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal 
Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, 
Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1988); see also Francis J. Mootz, 
III, Symposium on Philosophical Hermeneutics and Critical Legal Theory, 76 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 719 (2000). 
17. See infra Parts III-V. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Parts III-V. 
20. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2743-45 (2005) 
(striking down courthouse displays, including Ten Commandments 
monuments, where displays were created as a means to post the 
Commandments in the courthouses); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 
(2005) (plurality opinion) (upholding the display of a Ten Commandments 
monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1961 on the land 
between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court building). 
21. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-96, 598-600, 613-2l. 
(1989) 
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without ever seriously considering the words or structure of the text. 
It is not that the text has a fixed meaning, but rather that any 
evaluation of the text would be aided by interacting with the horizon 
of the text-the range of information that can be seen from the 
"vantage point" of the text.22 
This is not to say that extant judicial and academic discourse is 
useless. Some Justices (and commentators) have asked good 
questions, such as what impact a given religious object has on 
believers,23 and what impact it has on religious outsiders.24 Yet 
there are even more basic questions that need to be asked in order 
to adequately analyze the impact of religious objects on believers 
and nonbelievers alike. What is a religious object? Is there a 
difference between religious "objects" and religious "symbols"? 
This Article begins by asking and answering some of the 
threshold questions that have been all but ignored by the Court, but 
which have a major impact on the issues the Court grapples with in 
religious symbolism cases. Once we have a working understanding 
of religious objects and symbols, we can ask the more important 
questions for constitutional purposes, such as what the objects 
"mean" to believers and nonbelievers. One thing becomes 
abundantly clear after engaging in this analysis: there is no such 
thing as a "passive" religious object or symbol, even though the 
Court has asserted otherwise.25 Thus, the Court's analysis in 
religious symbolism cases, which rests heavily on the assumption 
that religious objects can be "passive,,,26 is inherently flawed 
regardless of which test the Court applies. 
Part II of this Article sets forth a definition for the term 
"religious object" and relates such objects to broader forms of 
religious symbolism. It suggests that the courts have grappled with 
three broad categories of religious objects in the symbolism cases 
and defines these categories. The three categories are labeled: (1) 
22. Cf GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 16, at 302-07 (explaining 
the concept of horizons in the interpretive process). 
23. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 700-01, 708-09, 711-12 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Allegheny, 492 
U.S. at 643-45 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
24. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 645 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
25. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864 (plurality opinion) (referring to a 
display of the Ten Commandments monument as "passive"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 
685 (referring to a creche as "passive"). 
26. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 685. 
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"Pure Religious Objects;" (2) "Multifaceted Religious Objects;" and 
(3) "Secularized Objects." The part asserts that the first category is 
the only one that is dispositive for constitutional purposes. 
Part III will provide some background on the key religious 
symbolism cases, including the spate of recent decisions involving 
Ten Commandments monuments and similar objects. Cases 
analyzing the Ten Commandments issue are excellent vehicles for 
exploring the questions raised in this Article because such decisions 
provide analysis of religious objects that are primarily multifaceted 
and which do not neatly fit with other types of religious objects. 
Part IV sets forth some of the major criticisms of the Court's 
approach in religious symbolism cases. This part will suggest that 
most of the criticisms are valid, but each criticism is related to the 
inherent problems with treating religious objects as legal subjects. 
Part V looks at the religious symbolism cases in light of the material 
in Part II, and demonstrates that the cases and critics miss an 
important element in religious symbolism cases-the nature of the 
objects themselves. This oversight explains why none of the current 
legal tests seem to produce satisfactory answers in religious 
symbolism cases. 
Part VI suggests an alternative approach that is sensitive to the 
problem of treating religious objects as legal subjects. This 
approach rejects both the Lemon27 and endorsement tests in 
religious symbolism cases because of their reflexive focus on the 
immediate context of religious displays,28 but it does take something 
from both of those tests. It also rejects the "tradition" test that was 
most recently used by a plurality of the Court in one of the Ten 
Commandments cases.29 The recommended approach asks whether 
government action substantially facilitates religion and suggests 
that the government violates the Establishment Clause any time it 
calls special attention to a religion's theological base, even if that is 
not the government's intent.3o This is a complex analysis and does 
not lead to automatic answers when the government displays objects 
that are not "pure religious objects." This Article suggests, however, 
27. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1972) (adopting a three-
part test for Establishment Clause queries). 
28. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616 (applying an endorsement test and 
relying on context of displays); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-85 (applying the three-
part Lemon test and relying on immediate context of displays); [d. at 690 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying an endorsement test). 
29. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863. 
30. See Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to 
Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. 
L. REV. 489, 544-58, 566-70 (2004) (setting forth the facilitation test and 
applying it to religious symbolism cases). 
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that government can never display "pure religious objects," except 
perhaps in a museum setting. This, of course, leads back to 
questions about the meaning of religious objects. 
II. WHAT IS A RELIGIOUS OBJECT? 
Religious objects are powerful representations that may connect 
to deeply held beliefs.3! For believers, they may be symbols of and 
conduits to transcendent and very real truths.32 This may have an 
impact on how such objects are perceived by nonbelievers who are 
aware of the power the objects have for believers.33 For others, such 
objects may retain some of the power they have for believers, or they 
may simply be things to look at.M 
Of course, not all religious symbols are religious objects.35 In 
fact, behavior, words, events, or ideas may reflect deep religious 
symbolism.36 This Article concerns itself primarily with tangible 
religious objects because these are what the courts most often 
grapple with in religious symbolism cases.a7 Still, the question of 
what constitutes a religious object remains. Courts have dealt with 
such disparate objects as crosses, creches, Ten Commandments 
monuments, menorahs and Christmas trees.as Are all of these items 
"religious objects"? If so, are all religious objects equally "religious"? 
This part provides a definition of religious objects, or rather a 
set of definitions. This is necessary in order to be able to analyze 
such objects as legal subjects in a nonreflexive way. Before doing 
this, however, it is essential to get a glimpse of how the Court (and 
some commentators) has characterized these objects. The Court's 
characterization will be discussed in much greater depth in Part III. 
In Lynch v. Donnelly,39 Justice Burger, writing for the Court, 
described a creche as follows: "The creche, like a painting is passive; 
admittedly it is a reminder of the origins of Christmas. Even the 
31. Zick, supra note 8, at 2309-11. 
32. Id.; I. PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 240 (1951). 
33. Brownstein, supra note 8, at 854-57; Karst, supra note 8, at 504. 
34. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing how secularized 
Christians might view a creche). 
35. Tillich's definition of religious symbols would include an event, an act, a 
story, or an object. A.R. McGlashan, Symbolization and Human Development: 
The Use of Symbols in Religion from the Perspective of Analytical Psychology, 25 
RELIGIOUS STUD. 501, 501 (1989) (citing I. PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 
(1957». 
36. Id. 
37. See infra Part III (discussing the various religious objects involved in 
religious symbolism cases). 
38. Id.; see also supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. 
39. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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traditional, purely secular displays extant at Christmas, with or 
without a creche, would inevitably recall the religious nature of the 
Holiday.,,40 Putting aside for the moment the highly questionable 
assertions that a painting is "passive" and that any Christmas 
display can be "purely secular," the idea that a creche is "passive" is 
simply out of touch with well accepted theological thought regarding 
religious symbols,41 as well as at least some anthropological 
thought. 42 Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality 
in Van Orden v. Perry, referred to the Ten Commandments 
monument involved in that case as "passive," both before and after 
acknowledging its religious significance.43 
A number of commentators have suggested that Justice 
Burger's description of the holiday display in Lynch, which included 
the creche, was the result of a reflexive application of his and the 
other Justices' preconceptions regarding such objects. These 
preconceptions, the argument goes, were both highly secularized 
and Christocentric.44 This seems a valid critique. One might think 
that Justice O'Connor's endorsement test would have helped to 
resolve such concerns, given its focus on the message sent by 
objects,45 but her concurring opinion in Lynch did little to suggest 
that she viewed the creche all that differently from the majority.46 
In Van Orden, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Ten 
Commandments are religiously significant, but he did so while 
40. [d. at 685. 
41. CHARLES H. LONG, SIGNIFICATIONS: SIGNS, SYMBOLS, AND IMAGES IN THE 
INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION 2 (1986); McGlashan, supra note 35, at 501; 
TILLICH, supra note 32, at 240. Long's reference to the power of symbols and 
signs may at first seem to conflict with Tillich's rather clear distinction between 
symbols and signs, but in context it does not seem that Long's description is at 
odds with that of Tillich. Regardless, both agree about the power of religious 
symbols including religious objects. 
42. Zick, supra note 8. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Ethos, World View, 
and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 126 
(1973) (providing an anthropological analysis of sacred and religious symbols). 
43. 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2864 (2005). 
44. See, e.g., Daan Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of 
Religious Neutrality, 45 MD. L. REV. 352, 354 (1986) (criticizing the Court's 
decision in Lynch as being essentially Christocentric, while also demeaning 
religion); Dolgin, supra note 11, at 504-05 (suggesting that the Court turned 
Christmas into a secularized, yet sectarian, religious event). 
45. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (setting forth the endorsement test and demonstrating that the test 
is focused on the perception of endorsement). 
46. This becomes apparent when one reads the majority opinion in Lynch 
and Justice O'Connor's concurrence. While the legal methodologies differed 
between the two opinions, the view of the religious object did not. Compare id. 
at 668 (majority opinion), with id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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attempting to show how they can also have secular relevance47-i.e., 
he acknowledged the "religious significance" of the Commandments, 
but he did not adequately analyze the significance of that 
"significance." Legal tests in this area seem to operate to reinforce 
the apparent preconceptions of the justices regarding the nature of 
specific religious objects or religious objects generally. 
Any legal approach to religious objects should account for the 
fact that they are not just passive "things," but rather powerful 
conduits for religious meaning and cultural meaning, at least for 
believers. The Lynch Court did not adequately analyze the nature of 
the creche. Moreover, to the extent the Court did evaluate the 
object, it failed to look at what theologians have long understood 
about the power of religious symbolism.4s This is also true of the 
plurality opinion in Van Orden and the Court's opinion in County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, where the Court analyzed several religious 
objects in different settings.49 
While Lynch and Allegheny framed the point differently,50 both 
Courts were quite focused on the potential message sent by the 
relevant religious objects in their given setting. 51 This, however, is 
the wrong inquiry; an object does not send messages as though it 
were some sort of informational strobe light. Rather, objects hold a 
range of messages to be discovered by those who interact with 
them.52 The observer brings his or her preconceptions to the 
interaction, and the object holds a range of possible messages for the 
observer that can be fleshed out as the observer's preconceptions 
interact with the object.53 Depending on how reflective the observer 
is, this process can be instantaneous or play out as the observer 
interacts with the object.54 Still, the object holds meaning based on 
the tradition(s) to which it relates (including its history, religious 
47. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2862-64. 
48. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680-88 (suggesting that creche could be 
desacrilized by its context, even if it retains it religious meaning more 
generally). 
49. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858-65; County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573 (1989) (analyzing a creche on the grand staircase of the courthouse 
and a menorah displayed near a Christmas tree on the grounds of city-county 
building). Allegheny is discussed in much greater detail at infra Parts III.A., 
III.C. 
50. See infra Part III.A. 
51. [d. 
52. Cf, GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 16, at 302-07 (discussing 
the concept of horizons and the role of text and interpreter in the interpretive 
process). 
53. Eskridge, supra note 16, at 623-24. 
54. Cf, id. (discussing the role of reflection in challenging one's 
preconceptions when one confronts a text). 
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significance, and cultural significance), and assuming the observer 
shares or is aware of this tradition, the horizon of the object acts as 
a constraining force on interpretation.55 This will be discussed 
further in Part V. For now, it is important to gain a better 
understanding of the religious objects that hold potential meaning 
for those who interact with them. 
The theologian Paul Tillich characterized religious symbols as 
pointing beyond themselves to important religious meaning, while 
simultaneously participating "in the reality to which [they] point.,,56 
More specifically, in the context of a broader discussion of religious 
symbols, Tillich wrote that "[r]eligious symbols are double-edged. 
They are directed toward the infinite which they symbolize and 
toward the finite through which they symbolize them. They force 
the infinite down to finitude and the finite up to infinity. They open 
the divine for the human and the human for the divine.',s7 
Similarly, anthropologist Clifford Geertz has written that 
religious symbols "function to synthesize people's ethos-the tone, 
character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and 
mood-and their world view-the picture they have of the way 
things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of 
order.,,58 
Far from being the passive "things" depicted by the Court, 
religious symbols, including objects, can point to transcendental 
truth and are constitutive for the believer. Any attempt to define 
religious objects, then, must determine what objects possess such 
traits and what objects do not, as well as how one would define 
objects that fall in between. Again, the purpose for undertaking this 
task is simply that courts must treat religious objects as legal 
subjects and thus determining the "nature" of these objects to the 
greatest extent possible is important. 
Tillich and Geertz are from quite different disciplines, yet they 
both write of the power of religious symbols. Of course, while both 
have been highly influential, they have each been controversial 
within their respective fields. Significantly, their views on religious 
symbols have generally been met with agreement, although that 
55. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 16, at 302-07; Eskridge, 
supra note 16, at 620-24. 
56. McGlashan, supra note 35, at 501 (referring to Tillich's definition of 
religious symbols). 
57. TILLICH, supra note 32, at 240. Religious symbols include more than 
simply tangible objects. Id. 
58. GEERTZ, Religion as a Culture System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CULTURES, supra note 42, at 87,89. For an excellent and detailed discussion of 
the relevance to law of Geertz's work in the symbolism area, including a 
reasonably detailed discussion of "sacred symbols," see Zick, supra note 8. 
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agreement is not universal. The prominent theologian Abraham 
Joshua Heschel disagreed with Tillich regarding his definition of 
religious symbols.59 For present purposes, however, it is significant 
that Heschel's disagreement with Tillich was over the religious 
value of symbols rather than the power they hold for believers,6o 
which is the relevant focus for the present Article. While Heschel 
suggests that religious symbols reduce G-d to a fiction and demean 
religion,61 and thus he rejects Tillich's notion that symbols have any 
real connection to the divine or the infinite, Heschel acknowledges 
the power religious symbols have.62 Therefore, his critique of Tillich 
does not undermine the idea that religious symbols are powerful; it 
suggests that power is dangerous rather than wondrous.63 
Moreover, aspects of Roman Catholic theology may be in tension 
with Tillich's dichotomy between the infinite and the divine, but, if 
anything, these differences enhance the theological power of 
religious objects rather than diminish it. 64 
I refer to Tillich and Geertz here because it seems logical to 
focus on the religious and cultural impact of religious symbols in the 
context of this Article. Moreover, their views of religious symbols 
are consistent with a wide range of semiotic theory.65 Thus, the 
following discussion of religious objects is consistent with a wide 
range of thought on religious symbolism. The key is to understand 
the power that religious objects have for believers and the potential 
impact this power may have on believers and nonbelievers when 
59. ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, MAN's QUEST FOR GoD: STUDIES IN PRAYER 
AND SYMBOLISM 129-30 (1954). 
60. Aaron L. Mackler, Symbols, Reality, and God: Heschel's Rejection of a 
Tillichian Understanding of Religious Symbols, 40 JUDAISM 290, 291-92 (1991). 
61. Id. at 290. 
62. HESCHEL, supra note 59, at 139; Mackler, supra note 60, at 292. 
63. Mackler compares Heschel to Tillich: 
Heschel shares important elements of Tillich's understanding of 
symbols. "A real symbol is a visible object that represents something 
invisible; something present representing something absent," which 
may make that thing (e.g., the Divine) present by partaking in its 
reality. Such a symbol, though powerful, is dangerous, for it may 
idolatrously be understood to be equivalent to the Divine. 
Mackler, supra note 60, at 292 (citing HESCHEL, supra note 59, at 139). 
64. An excellent example of this would be church doctrine regarding relics 
and the connection between relics and G-d. JOHN A. RARDON, S.J., THE 
CATHOLIC CATECHISM 298-99 (1975) (quoting the Second Ecumenical Council 
Nicea regarding relics: "[Tlhe honor paid to the image passes on to the one who 
is represented, so that the person who venerates an image venerates the living 
reality whom the image depicts," and also noting similar statements from the 
Second Council of the Vatican). 
65. Cf Marshall, supra note 13, at 513-14 (discussing Raymond Firth's 
definition of "symbol"). 
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these objects are displayed by government or on government 
property. 
A. Classifying "Religious" Objects 
In order to address the issues raised in later sections of this 
Article it is essential to discuss the various types of objects that 
courts have addressed. This section will introduce three categories 
into which these objects generally fall: (1) "Pure Religious Objects;,,66 
(2) "Multifaceted Religious Objects;,,67 and (3) "Secularized Religious 
Objects.,,68 A deeper analysis of each category will be set forth after 
a review of several significant religious symbolism cases.69 
Significantly, the courts intuit but generally do not analyze the 
different categories into which religious objects fall. In fact, because 
courts often fail to consider the nature of the religious objects they 
analyze, they sometimes end up treating "pure religious objects" the 
same as "secularized religious objects,,,70 and this has created a great 
deal of mischief in the relevant legal doctrine.71 Paying more 
attention to the religious objects themselves would make it harder 
for courts-specifically the Supreme Court-to reflexively act on 
preconceptions when analyzing religious objects as legal subjects.72 
1. Pure Religious Objects 
Objects of veneration, objects used in religious ritual, and some 
objects that represent core religious principles (such as a creche) can 
easily be defined as religious objects. This Article refers to these as 
"pure religious objects.,,73 These objects raise immediate concerns 
66. See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text. 
67. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
68. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
69. See infra Parts V, VI. 
70. Lynch and Allegheny provide examples of this lack of distinction among 
the different types of religious objects. In Lynch, the creche was treated 
essentially as just another object in a broader holiday display that included a 
number of secularized objects associated with Christmas. Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring). In Allegheny, the menorah 
was treated as such because of its location near a Christmas tree-an arguably 
secularized religious object-and a sign saluting liberty, a totally secular object. 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 614 (1989). 
71. The Court's doctrine has been criticized by numerous scholars from a 
variety of perspectives. This criticism is discussed in greater detail at infra 
Part VI. 
72. See infra Part V. 
73. I derive this term from the notion of "pure symbols" in the free speech 
area. Calvin Massey defines pure symbols as "those in which the symbol's 
corporeal existence is necessarily fused with the message it conveys . . . ." 
Calvin R. Massey, Pure Symbols and the First Amendment, 17 HASTINGS CONST. 
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when displayed by the government.74 While a more detailed 
discussion will be provided later in this Article, it is important to 
note that objects such as creches, crosses, and menorahs fall into 
this category.75 Pure religious objects relate to the rituals or 
represent the central stories of a given religion as understood by any 
of the traditions within a religion, or they are venerated.76 They do 
not by themselves hold much, if any, secular meaning. They, to use 
Tillich's conceptualization, point to the infinite.77 What religious 
symbols symbolize for a believer is often profound and transcendent, 
yet the Court's doctrine in the religious symbolism cases does not 
reflect this.78 One possible exception is Stone v. Graham,79 where the 
Court at least acknowledged the sacredness of the Ten 
Commandments. Ironically, while the Ten Commandments are 
sacred to several faiths, the Court never analyzed whether the form 
of display proscribed by the challenged Kentucky statute would be 
sacred.80 While the Ten Commandments themselves are 
undoubtedly sacred to those who believe in them, would a wall 
plaque that includes a note suggesting a connection between the 
L.Q. 369,373 (1990); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 
12 WM. & MARy BILL RTS. J. 367, 369 (2004) (discussing how the message in 
certain symbols invites reply through the use of those same symbols). Pure 
religious objects, like "pure symbols," signify through their corporeal existence a 
message regarding the infmite. For example, the display of a pure religious 
object in a museum may affect the relationship between the government and 
that object for constitutional purposes and may affect the message that object 
sends to some observers, but its physical form still signifies the infinite and the 
divine. See TILLICH, supra note 32, at 240. 
74. See infra Part VI (applying the "facilitation test" to the government's 
display of religious objects). 
75. See infra Parts III, VI. 
76. Some religious objects or symbols may hold little meaning for one 
tradition within a religion but may for others. For example, a rosary would 
hold religious meaning for Catholics but not for most Protestants even though 
both are part of the broader Christian tradition. An object need not be a 
powerful symbol for all traditions within a religion in order to be considered a 
pure religious object. It need only be so for one tradition (so long as it is 
recognized as being powerful for those within the tradition by some outside the 
tradition). 
77. TILLICH, supra note 32, at 240; McGlashan, supra note 35, at 501. 
78. See infra Part III (addressing Court's doctrine in religious symbolism 
cases). 
79. 449 U.s. 39, 41-42 (1981) (per curiam). In the more recent Ten 
Commandments cases, however, the Court acknowledged the religious nature of 
the Commandments in a manner that did not seriously analyze the relevance of 
their religious nature. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2739 (2005); 
Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2863 (2005); see infra notes 204-315 and 
accompanying text. 
80. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41. 
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Commandments and secular law be sacred? Would it even be a 
religious object? 
2. Multifaceted Religious Objects 
The answers to the two questions mentioned above-"it 
depends" and "yes"-lead us to the next category of religious objects: 
"multifaceted religious objects." Multifaceted religious objects share 
traits with pure religious objects in that they are relevant to the 
theology of a given religion or religious tradition. They are not, 
however, objects used in rituals or objects that are generally 
venerated.81 Most importantly, they are objects that may symbolize 
deeper religious meaning for believers and nonbelievers, but they 
may hold widely varying messages even for believers. 
For example, a pure religious symbol like a creche symbolizes a 
sacred moment for most devout Christians, and even if theological 
interpretations and personal and emotional responses vary, the 
power of the story represented in the creche still exists for 
believers.82 A Ten Commandments monument mayor may not illicit 
the same type of response, especially when it includes other secular 
symbols or writings. Many believers may respond to the object's 
symbolism and the powerful religious message that potentially 
inheres in the Ten Commandments.83 Others, however, may not. 
For example, some believers may see it as a political statement (as 
might many nonbelievers). In fact, other than in synagogues, one 
rarely sees the depiction of the Ten Commandments in houses of 
worship, and the Jewish community has not generally been 
associated with attempts to display the Ten Commandments on 
government property. 
There is more of a disjunction between the symbol and the 
symbolized with a Ten Commandments monument accompanied by 
other texts than with a creche.84 The former suggests that the Ten 
81. While these objects are not generally venerated or used in rituals, 
disputes over them have sometimes led to prayer and other religious 
ceremonies near the objects. A good example of this is provided by the situation 
resulting from the behavior of former Alabama Supreme Court Justice Roy 
Moore. People regularly prayed near the Ten Commandments monument he 
installed in the state courthouse building. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 
1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). 
82. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 700-01, 708-09, 711-12 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Zick, supra note 
8, at 2309-10,2371. 
83. This was apparent in the response to former Justice Moore's Ten 
Commandments monument. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; infra 
Part III.D. 
84. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAw 
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 189 (1993) (suggesting that the 
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Commandments are important, but there is no automatic latent 
suggestion as to why, while the latter represents a more direct and 
more purely religious message. This might be so even if the Ten 
Commandments monument does not include other symbols or texts. 
However, this does not mean that Ten Commandments monuments 
displayed by government are automatically constitutional.85 In the 
religious symbolism context, the messages an object may hold for 
observers are often varied, but the power inhering in the object may 
crosscut the variety of messages it holds. The recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions involving the Ten Commandments will be discussed 
later in this Article. Those decisions include some new approaches, 
but end up raising the same old problems.86 
3. Secularized Religious Objects 
The final category of religious objects is "secularized religious 
objects." These are objects generally associated with a particular 
religion and/or its holidays, but which do not themselves have a 
specific theological base or which have lost association with any 
such base even for believers. These objects are not "religious 
objects" in the same sense that pure and multifaceted religious 
objects are, but because courts must sometimes address them, they 
are included in the present discussion. Secularized religious objects 
may symbolize a religious holiday or be connected to a religion, but 
they are not themselves imbued with theological relevance (or they 
have lost their theological relevance over time). Perhaps the best 
examples of such objects are Christmas trees and Santas. A 
discussion of the constitutionality of displaying such objects is left to 
later sections of this Article.87 For now, it is enough to note that 
there are significant differences between these objects and "pure 
religious objects," and there are also differences between these 
objects and "multifaceted religious objects.,,88 Yet, the display of 
secularized religious objects should not always be constitutional. 
Court in Stone overlooked the possibility that the Commandments might 
"inculcate some of the admittedly spiritual but not necessarily religious values 
with which many of the Commandments are concerned ... "). 
85. See infra notes 194-391, 522-44 and accompanying text. 
86. See infra notes 204-315 and accompanying text. 
87. See infra Parts V, VI. 
88. The latter types of objects have a closer connection between their 
corporeal existence and the meaning they signify. See Massey, supra note 83, 
at 373. Or put differently, they symbolize the infinite or the divine, while 
secularized religious objects do not necessarily do so. See TILLICH, supra note 
32, at 240. Multifaceted objects fall somewhere in between as the term 
suggests, but they do evoke greater signification of the infinite or divine than 
secularized religious objects would. 
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Before exploring this further, however, it is useful to look at the 
Court's approach to religious objects. It is also useful to look at 
lower court cases involving religious objects that the Court has 
never directly addressed. This will help frame a deeper discussion 
of the nature of the various types of religious objects and whether it 
is constitutional for government to display them. 
III. THE RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM CASES 
The United States Supreme Court has decided six cases 
involving the display of religious objects or symbols by government 
entities or on public property. In Lynch v. Donnelll9 and in County 
of Allegheny v. ACLU,9o the Court addressed the display of creches 
by government entities. Allegheny also involved the display of a 
large Menorah next to an even larger Christmas tree accompanied 
by a sign saluting liberty.91 In Stone v. Graham,92 the Court 
addressed a Kentucky statute that required a copy of the Ten 
Commandments to be placed on a wall in all public school 
classrooms in the state. More recently, in McCreary County v. 
ACLU,93 the Court struck down displays at two Kentucky 
courthouses that included the Ten Commandments. Moreover, in 
Van Orden v. Perry,94 the Court upheld the display of a Ten 
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State 
Capitol. Finally, in Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. 
Pinette,95 the Court addressed the placement of a large cross on 
government property that was deemed a public forum. In Capitol 
Square, the public forum issue was dispositive of the outcome.96 
Each ofthese cases will be discussed below. In addition, there are a 
number of lower court decisions addressing everything from large 
Latin crosses97 to Ten Commandments monuments.98 
89. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
90. 492 U.s. 573 (1989). 
91. Id. at 614. 
92. 449 U.S. 39 (1981) (per curiam). 
93. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
94. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
95. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
96. Id. at 754. 
97. A surprising number of cases have involved government display of 
crosses. See Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004); Carpenter v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 1996); Separation of Church & 
State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996); Ellis v. City of La 
Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993); Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 
(5th Cir. 1991); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991); Mendelson 
v. City ofSt. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Jewish War Veterans of 
the United States v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1 CD.D.C. 1987); ACLU v. City 
of St. Charles, 622 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. 
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This part will set forth the ways in which courts have 
approached a variety of religious objects and symbols. The section 
will be organized around the objects themselves. Thus, there will be 
separate subparts devoted to creches, crosses, menorahs, Ten 
Commandments displays, Christmas trees, and other holiday 
displays. Naturally, some of these objects overlap in a given display, 
and this too will be discussed. A major focus, however, will be Ten 
Commandments displays because of the unique and important 
questions they raise.99 
A. Creches 
In Lynch, the Court considered whether a creche that was 
placed in a park in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, as part of a larger 
Christmas display that included such things as a Santa Claus house 
and plastic reindeer, violated the Establishment Clause. lOo The city 
owned the display and clearly supported and sponsored its erection 
in the park. lOl Thus, this was a case involving a government-
supported display. The Court held that the display was 
constitutional, ostensibly applying the Lemon test, which was the 
then-prevailing test for Establishment Clause claims.102 In applying 
that test the Court utilized an analysis similar to reasoning it had 
used in Marsh v. Chambersl03 to uphold the practice of legislative 
prayer. The Court noted the long history of various forms of 
government interaction with religion, such as legislative chaplains. 
The Court acknowledged the religious meaning of the creche, yet 
held that holiday displays like that in Pawtucket are part of a long 
tradition connected to the winter holiday season and that Christmas 
has a secular aspect in addition to its religious aspects. 104 
The Court focused heavily on the importance of the broader 
context of the display, which included "a Santa Claus house, 
reindeer pulling a sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, 
carolers, cutout figures [of a] clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, 
City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338 (Or. 1976) (en bane); Lowe v. City of Eugene, 463 
P.2d 360 (Or. 1969) (en bane); see also Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 
1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving sale of public land on which a large Latin 
cross stood under circumstances that raised constitutional concerns under the 
state's "Establishment Clause"); Gonzales v. N. Township, 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 
1993) (involving public display of a crucifix). 
98. See infra Part IILD. 
99. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra Part III.D. 
100. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670 (1984). 
101. Id. at 671-72. 
102. Id. at 678-85,687. 
103. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
104. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674-78,682,686-87. 
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hundreds of colored lights, [and] a large banner that [read] 
'SEASONS GREETINGS' .... ,,105 It also noted the display's 
connection to the secular and commercial aspects of the holiday. In 
this context, the display as 8 whole represented the secular aspects 
of Christmas. lOG Thus, while the creche is a religious symbol,107 it did 
not foster a government establishment of religion in the context of 
the broader display and the holiday season, because that context 
demonstrated both a secular purpose and a primary effect that 
neither advanced nor inhibited religion. lOS In a passage that has 
particular import for the topic of this Article, the Court referred to 
the creche as "passive.,,109 The Court also found no entanglement 
because of the low cost of the display and held that political 
divisiveness, which was an element of entanglement at that time, 
was insufficient by itself to support an Establishment Clause 
claim.11o In short, the Court acknowledged the fact that a creche is a 
religious symbol but essentially ignored or minimized any 
significant discussion of the challenged object itself. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
introduced the "endorsement test."lll While many people have 
questioned Justice O'Connor's application of that test in Lynch,ll2 
the test itself has become highly influential, especially in cases 
involving government-supported or endorsed religious symbols. 113 
Justice O'Connor wrote: 
105. [d. at 67l. 
106. [d. at 679-83, 685-86. 
107. [d. at 687; Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": 
Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEx. L. REV. 955, 1002-03 
(1989) (arguing that some critics of the decision misunderstand the majority's 
secularization position; it did not result from a conclusion that the creche lost 
its religious meaning because of its placement, but rather the majority 
employed a broad notion of the secular and found that the religious symbol 
served a secular purpose in the context involved). 
108. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-85,687. 
109. [d. at 685. This passage is discussed in much greater detail at supra 
Part II. 
110. [d. at 683-85. 
111. [d. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
112. See infra Part IV (discussing scholarly criticism of the Court's religious 
symbolism cases, including criticism of Justice O'Connor's application of the 
endorsement test). 
113. For example, in the Court's first religious symbolism case after Lynch, 
County of Allegheny u. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-97 (1989), the Court applied 
the endorsement test, and the test has been applied in numerous religious 
symbolism cases by lower courts. See, e.g., infra Part III.D. (discussing Ten 
Commandments cases that involved the application of the endorsement test 
along with other relevant tests). 
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The Establishment Clause prohibits government from 
making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a 
person's standing in the political community. Government 
can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One 
is excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which 
may interfere with the independence of the institutions, 
give the institutions access to government or governmental 
powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, 
and foster the creation of political constituencies defined 
along religious lines. The second and more direct 
infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of 
religion. Endorsement sends a message to non adherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message. 114 
Later, in her concurring opinion, she characterized the inquiry 
into the display as follows: 
The central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has 
endorsed Christianity by its display of the creche. To 
answer that question, we must examine both what 
Pawtucket intended to communicate in displaying the 
creche and what message the city's display actually 
conveyed. The purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test 
represent these two aspects of the meaning of the city's 
t · 115 ac Ion. 
As has been pointed out repeatedly in the scholarly literature, 
Justice O'Connor's application of this test-a test that was at least 
ostensibly concerned with religious ingroup/outgroup dynamics in 
the political realm-seemed to betray the words of the test. 116 This 
114. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
115. Id. at 690. 
116. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perception, and Doctrinal Illusions: 
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 
291-95 (1987) (arguing that the reasonable observer standard under the 
endorsement test creates several problems, including offending "the central 
principle of Justice O'Connor's own test" by favoring the majority perspective); 
March D. Coleman, Comment, The Angel Tree Project, 58 U. PIT!'. L. REV. 475, 
489 (1997) (arguing that Justice O'Connor's reasonable observer standard is 
problematic in that it ignores the "actual perceptions of real citizens ... "); cf 
Marshall, supra note 13, at 537 (arguing that the "objective" reasonable 
observer standard in Justice O'Connor's application of the endorsement test is 
likely to actually end up reflecting the subjective views of the judge(s) applying 
it). 
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is especially vivid when one learns in the dissenting opinions that 
the city and mayor supported keeping "Christ in Christmas.,,1l7 
Justice O'Connor found that the city's purpose was not to endorse 
Christianity, but rather to celebrate the secular aspects of a public 
holiday that has "cultural significance."llB Her discussion of effects 
follows a similar line of reasoning: 
Pawtucket's display of its creche, I believe, does not 
communicate a message that the government intends to 
endorse the Christian beliefs represented by the creche. 
Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance of 
the creche, as the District Court found, is not neutralized by 
the setting, the overall holiday setting changes what 
viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the 
display-as a typical museum setting, though not 
neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, 
negates any message of endorsement of that content. The 
display celebrates a public holiday, and no one contends 
that declaration of that holiday is understood to be an 
endorsement of religion. The holiday itself has very strong 
secular components and traditions.1l9 
Thus, while Justice O'Connor would have applied a different 
test than the Lynch majority, her analysis under that test is quite 
similar to the majority's approach. In fact she acknowledged this in 
her concurring opinion.120 The physical context of the creche figured 
prominently in her analysis as does the privileging or 
desacrilization, depending on one's perspective, of Christmas. 121 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. filed a dissenting opinion joined by 
Justices Harry Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall and John Paul 
Stevens,122 and Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion joined by 
Justice Stevens.123 The dissenting opinions pointed out that had the 
Court applied the Lemon test in the manner it had in other cases 
under the Establishment Clause, the government-sponsored creche 
would not have survived scrutiny.124 Justice Brennan's dissenting 
opinion also pointed out that placing a patently religious symbol 
117. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 700-01 n.6 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
118. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
119. [d. at 692. 
120. [d. at 687. 
121. [d. at 692-93. 
122. [d. at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
123. [d. at 726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
124. [d. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 726-27 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
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representing an event central to Christian theology in the context of 
a broader display of items connected to the Christmas holiday is 
likely to favor the dominant Christian tradition, and thus could not 
be saved by relying on the commercialized aspects of the holiday.125 
Such government action favoring one religion would violate the 
Lemon test. 126 Moreover, both dissents argued that by minimizing 
the religious import of the creche in the context of the display the 
Court both degraded the religious meaning of the symbol and the 
holiday and failed to address the exclusionary message the display 
sent to non-Christians. 127 
In Allegheny, the Court also addressed a creche display.128 AB 
will be discussed below, that case also involved the display of a 
Menorah and a Christmas tree.129 The Court's analysis of the creche 
utilized the endorsement approach set forth by Justice O'Connor in 
Lynch. 130 AB in Lynch, the physical context of the creche display was 
central to the Court's decision. 131 The creche was owned by the Holy 
Name Society, a Roman Catholic organization, and was located on 
the grand staircase of the county courthouse. It was not surrounded 
by sundry plastic figures and other "secular" symbols of the "holiday 
season," as had been the creche in Lynch.132 It was surrounded on 
three sides by a wooden fence, and red and white poinsettia plants 
were placed around the creche. 133 There was a sign denoting that 
the creche was donated by the Holy Name Society, and there were 
small evergreen trees decorated with a red bow that basically 
blended into the creche's manger scene. 134 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, held that the display of 
the creche violated the Establishment Clause because, unlike the 
creche in Lynch, the creche in the Allegheny County Courthouse 
sent a message endorsing Christianity and "nothing in the creche's 
setting detract [ed] from that message.,,135 Government may 
"acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomenon" but may not 
celebrate it as a "Christian holy day.,,136 The creche, which has an 
obvious religious message, is a celebration of the religious aspects of 
125. Id. at 697,700-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 708-09, 711-12; id. at 726-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
128. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.s. 573, 578-81, 598-602 (1989). 
129. Id. at 578, 581-87, 613-21. 
130. Id. at 592-95. 
131. Id. at 598-600. 
132. Id. at 580-81, 598-99. 
133. Id. at 580. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 598-602. 
136. Id. at 601. 
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the holiday.137 Interestingly, Lynch and Allegheny together stand for 
the proposition that a patently religious symbol, the creche, can 
somehow become adequately secularized if part of a larger holiday 
display celebrating the "secular aspects" of Christmas.138 The Court 
did not hold that the creche loses its religious nature based on its 
context,139 but rather that in some contexts its religious message is 
appropriately secularized such that government may display it.140 
This argument is inconsistent with the general understanding of 
religious objects and symbols. 141 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Byron White, 
strongly dissented from this portion ofthe Court's holding.142 Justice 
Kennedy would have upheld the display of the creche based on his 
reading of Lynch and Marsh. 143 Instead of applying the endorsement 
test, he would have applied a test based on religious coercion. 144 
Significantly, he recognized the religious nature of the creche, 145 
which will be discussed later in this Article.146 There are also a 
number of decisions by lower courts involving creches that are 
generally consistent with the Court's reasoning in Lynch and 
Allegheny. 147 
B. Crosses 
Perhaps the most famous case involving the display of a cross 
on government property is Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board 
v. Pinette,148 which involved the display of a large cross on the 
grounds of the Ohio Statehouse. The cross was placed there by the 
137. Id. at 598-60l. 
138. See generally Allegheny, 492 U.s. 573; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984). 
139. See Smith, supra note 117, at 1002. 
140. Id. 
141. See infra Part V. 
142. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
143. Id. at 662-63, 679. 
144. Id. at 659-74,677-79. 
145. Id. at 662-64. 
146. See infra Part V. 
147. Lower court decisions that claim to be consistent with the Court's 
approach in Lynch and Allegheny include ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 99-
104 (3d Cir. 1999); Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 53-55 (2d Cir. 
1997); Am. Jewish Congo v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 
1996); Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953, 956, 960 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Jocham v. Tuscola County, 239 F. Supp. 2d 714, 740-42 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
148. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
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Ku Klux Klan, a notorious hate groUp.149 The Court held that the 
square was a public forum for speech purposes.150 Because the 
government wanted to exclude the cross from the square, a public 
forum, the State needed to articulate a compelling governmental 
interest to support the exclusion of the religious message. 151 This is 
because the State's actions in attempting to exclude the cross 
constituted content discrimination.152 The State's reason for 
excluding the cross was compliance with the Establishment 
Clause. 153 The Court acknowledged that compliance with the 
Establishment Clause could constitute a compelling government 
interest,154 but determined that the State's action in this case was 
not mandated by the Establishment Clause because the it does not 
prohibit private religious expression in a public forum. 155 Thus, the 
State could not exclude the cross without violating the Free Speech 
Clause.156 Of course, there was a strong argument that the 
expression was not primarily religious, but rather hate-based given 
h 157 t e source. 
A plurality of the Court rejected what it referred to as the 
"transferred endorsement test"-essentially the endorsement test 
advocated by Justice O'Connor. 15S "Transferred endorsement" was 
the plurality's shorthand for the idea that the State could be liable 
for endorsement of religion if a reasonable observer would perceive 
the expression of private actors on public land as endorsed by the 
government. 159 The plurality rejected the idea that actions of private 
individuals could be endorsed by the government in a public forum 
even if an outsider might mistake the private action for state 
t · 160 ac IOn. 
Because it was resolved primarily under the Free Speech 
Clause, the Court's opinion involved little discussion of the nature of 
the religious object involved. Yet the dissenting opinions evidenced 
a great concern about the religious nature of the cross and the 
149. Id. at 757-59. 
150. Id. at 759, 76l. 
151. Id. at 76l. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 761-62. 
155. Id. at 762-70. 
156. Id. at 765-70. 
157. Id. at 770-71 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 798 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
158. Id. at 764. 
159. Id. at 764-70. 
160. Id. 
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message its placement on Ohio's Capitol Square would send.16l 
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion demonstrated concern about the 
perspective of religious outsiders. 162 For example, when a 
nonbeliever or religious minority passes Capitol Square and sees a 
large cross, it is quite possible that she will perceive the cross as a 
symbol of majoritarian dominance even if she realizes that the 
government did not erect it. 163 This is bolstered by the fact that the 
majority religion in the United States (including Ohio) is 
Christianity (although there are certainly a diversity of Christian 
sects and denominations).164 Thus, it is likely that to the extent 
religious symbols that share religious messages are exhibited on the 
Square, the vast majority of these messages will be Christian, or at 
the very least, reflective of mainstream Western religions.165 This 
may be compounded during the holidays since Christmas trees and 
appropriate "holiday" decorations may be displayed by 
government. 166 Justice Stevens therefore suggests that the resulting 
message to nonbelievers and religious minorities may be, to use 
Justice O'Connor's language, that they are outsiders and not full 
members of the community.167 The fact that the Square is a public 
forum does not change this fact.16s 
While Capitol Square is the only United States Supreme Court 
case involving the display of a cross on government property, there 
are a number of cases in the lower courts. Significantly, many of 
these cases involve government display of crosses rather than 
161. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
162. Id. at 799-800. 
163. Cf id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that some citizens 
might perceive the cross "as a message of exclusion-a statehouse sign calling 
powerfully to mind their outsider status"); see also STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, 
PLEASE Do NOT WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997) (discussing perceptions of Christian 
dominance in American history and the difference between insider and outsider 
views regarding religion in public life). 
164. See, e.g., Mark G. Valencia, Comment, Take Care of Me When I Am 
Dead: An Examination of American Church-State Development and the Future 
of American Religious Liberty, 49 SMU L. REV. 1579, 1634 (1996) ("The vast 
majority of American adults (86.5%) identify themselves as Christian."). 
165. This is reflected in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) and County 
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), where a creche (Lynch), and a 
Christmas tree and menorah (as well as a creche) (Allegheny), were the dispiays 
at issue. It is also reflected in the types of objects that are generally involved in 
cases in the lower courts. See generally Part III (discussing a number of court 
decisions involving creches, crosses, menorahs, Ten Commandments 
monuments and objects such as Christmas trees and Santas). 
166. Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
167. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650-51, (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
168. Id. 
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private displays in a public forum. For example, in Separation of 
Church & State Committee v. City of Eugene/69 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a fifty-one foot tall 
concrete Latin cross that had been erected in a public park and 
subsequently designated a war memorial, violated the 
Establishment Clause.17o The cross was illuminated on certain 
holidays.l7l In a per curiam opinion, the court held that the display 
endorsed Christianity: 
There is no question that the Latin cross is a symbol of 
Christianity, and that its placement on public land by the City 
of Eugene violates the Establishment Clause. Because the 
cross may reasonably be perceived as governmental 
endorsement of Christianity, the City of Eugene has 
impermissibly breached the First Amendment's "wall of 
separation" between church and state. 172 
Thus, the court acknowledged in unequivocal terms that the cross is 
1· . b 1 173 a re IglOuS sym o. 
Judge O'Scannlain filed an opinion concurring in the result. 174 
He would have engaged in a more fact-sensitive inquiry into the 
context of the display, but, like the majority, he acknowledged the 
potential religious message of the cross in the context at issue. 175 
Moreover, there have been a number of surprisingly similar cases 
decided under the United States Constitution and several state 
constitutions. 176 Most of these cases seem to treat crosses as pure 
religious symbols. 
C. Menorahs 
As noted earlier,177 the Allegheny decision also addressed the 
placement of a menorah outside the City-County Building.178 The 
menorah was owned by Chabad-Lubavich, a Hasidic Jewish group,179 
and was placed near a large Christmas tree and a sign saluting 
169. 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 
170. Id. at 618-20. 
171. Id. at 618. 
172. Id. at 620 (footnote omitted). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 620 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in the result). 
175. Id. at 624-26. 
176. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra Part lILA. 
178. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989). 
179. Id. at 587. Although the menorah was owned by Chabad, it was 
"stored, erected, and removed each year by the city." Id. 
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liberty.180 The Court acknowledged the religious nature and history 
of the menorah181 and its associated holiday, Chanukah.182 Yet, the 
Court held that the context of the menorah-situated near the 
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty-did not endorse either 
Judaism specifically or religion generally. 183 Rather, the Court held 
the display sent a message recognizing religious pluralism and 
cultural diversity.184 The Court viewed the display as representing 
the winter holiday season rather than a specific religion or 
holiday.185 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stressed that 
the message sent by the display to a reasonable observer was a 
message of tolerance and good tidings for the holiday season. 186 
Even though the majority provided a rather detailed discussion of 
the theological and historical relevance of the menorah, the Court's 
approach demonstrates that there is an important difference 
between explaining the history of a religious object or discussing its 
role in ritual or theology and carefully considering what an object's 
theological or ritualistic role says about it. 
Justices Brennan and Stevens authored opinions dissenting 
from the Court's holding regarding the menorah. 187 Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, agreed with the 
majority that Chanukah and the menorah are religious but 
disagreed that the context of the display could adequately secularize 
the menorah. 188 Interestingly, Justice Brennan also questioned the 
notion that the Christmas tree was necessarily a secular symbol 
(even if it could be in some contexts)189 but ultimately focused 
primarily on the meaning and message of the menorah. In his view, 
the menorah was purely a religious object. 19o Justice Stevens, in an 
opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued that "the 
Establishment Clause should be construed to create a strong 
presumption against the display of religious symbols on public 
property."l91 Both Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens were 
180. [d. at 582. 
181. [d. at 583-85. 
182. [d. at 585. 
183. [d. at 617-20. 
184. [d. at 619-20. 
185. [d. at 617-20. 
186. [d. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
187. [d. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. 
at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
188. [d. at 643-45 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
189. [d. at 638-41. 
190. [d. at 643-44. 
191. [d. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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concerned that the Court's decision would offend believers and 
nonbelievers alike by minimizing the religious meaning of the object 
involved-in this case a menorah-and by minimizing the impact 
such displays have on religious outsiders and nonbelievers. 192 A 
number of lower courts have followed the Allegheny Court's 
I . 193 ana YSIS. 
D. Ten Commandments Displays 
In Stone v. Graham,194 the Court held that a Kentucky law 
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public 
school classroom in the state violated the Establishment Clause. 
The law required the inclusion of a notation "concerning the purpose 
of the display," which focused on the "secular application of the Ten 
Commandments" in legal codes.195 Stone is a short per curiam 
opinion,196 but it is notable for purposes of the discussion herein. 
Specifically, the Court stated, "[t]he Ten Commandments are 
undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faith, and no 
legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to 
that fact.,,197 As this passage suggests, the Court held that the law 
failed the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test because there 
was no valid secular purpose for mandating the posting of a sacred 
text on the walls of every public school classroom in the state.19S 
Justice Rehnquist dissented, suggesting that the State may 
have had a valid secular purpose for posting the Ten 
Commandments because of the Commandments' impact on Western 
legal codes.199 Thus, the State could conclude "that a document with 
such secular significance should be placed before its students, with 
an appropriate statement of the document's secular import.,,2oo 
Obviously, there was serious disagreement over the "undeniably" 
sacred nature of the Ten Commandments in Stone. This Article 
argues the Stone majority's view of the nature of the Ten 
Commandments is more. in keeping with theological and 
anthropological views of religious symbols and objects.201 
Any potential that this language from Stone had to convince the 
192. [d. at 644-46 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 650-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
193. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
194. 449 U.S. 39 (1981) (per curiam). 
195. [d. at 39 n.l. 
196. [d. at 39-43. 
197. [d. at 4l. 
198. [d. at 40-43. 
199. [d. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
200. [d. 
201. See supra Part II; infra Part V. 
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Court to seriously consider the impact of the religious nature of 
religious objects was never realized. In subsequent cases, the Court 
paid lip service to the historical or theological relevance of religious 
objects, but any serious consideration of the power of these objects 
ended there.202 This trend continued in the Court's most recent Ten 
Commandments decisions, which have added confusion regarding 
the principles and legal tests applicable in religious symbolism 
cases.
203 
Over the last five years, the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have each decided cases 
involving Ten Commandments displays.204 Two of those cases 
recently reached the Supreme Court.205 In McCreary County u. 
ACLU,206 the Court held that Ten Commandments displays in two 
separate county courthouses were unconstitutiona1.207 The Court 
relied on the secular purpose prong of the Lemon and endorsement 
tests.208 The history of the displays in question played a significant 
role in the Court's analysis. Each of the displays originally 
consisted of a framed copy of the Ten Commandments taken from 
the King James version of the Bible.209 The courthouse displays 
were readily visible to those using the courthouse.2!o In response to 
a lawsuit aimed at forcing the counties to remove the displays, the 
counties modified the displays to include a variety of other 
documents, including a "passage from the Declaration of 
Independence; the Preamble to the Constitution of Kentucky; the 
national motto, 'In God We Trust;' [and] a page from the 
Congressional Record ... " declaring 1983 the year of the Bible.21l 
202. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); supra Parts I1LA.-II1.B. 
203. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. 
Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
204. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (striking down the 
display of a Ten Commandments monument in the rotunda of the Alabama 
state courthouse); Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 
2003) (upholding the display of a small Ten Commandments plaque on the old 
entrance to the county courthouse); King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271 
(11th Cir. 2003) (upholding the use of a small seal that included a depiction of 
the Ten Commandments, but not the text, along with other images); Adland v. 
Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002) (striking down the display of a Ten 
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Capitol); Books v. City of 
Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000) (striking down the display of a Ten 
Commandments monument located on grounds of the city municipal building). 
205. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. 2722; Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854. 
206. 125 S. Ct. 2722. 
207. [d. at 2745. 
208. [d. at 2732-33. 
209. [d. at 2728. 
210. [d. 
211. [d. at 2729. 
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Each of the documents mentioned G-d, and some documents were 
edited to include only the religious references contained in them.212 
The district court granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary 
injunction despite these modifications to the displays. 
In response, the counties posted a third version of the displays 
that included fuller versions of some of the same documents 
contained in the second version, but also included some additional 
documents that did not reference G_d. 213 The new displays also 
included a "prefatory document" that claimed the displays contained 
"documents that played a significant role in the foundation of our 
system of law and government.,,214 The prefatory document 
suggested that the Ten Commandments influenced the Declaration 
of Independence, but made no attempt to connect the Ten 
Commandments to the other items in the display.215 This 
unsubstantiated connection was highly relevant to both the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Supreme 
Court.216 
The Supreme Court's majority opinion was authored by Justice 
David Souter217 and focused heavily on the history of the display and 
the lack of a secular purpose evinced by that history.218 The Court's 
analysis began with a promising quote from Stone v. Graham 
recognizing that the Ten Commandments "are undeniably a sacred 
text in the Jewish and Christian faiths,,,219 but rather than analyzing 
that point or what it might mean under the Establishment Clause, 
the Court moved into its secular purpose analysis, recognizing that 
the Stone court found the religious nature of the text relevant in 
determining that there was no secular purpose.220 The Court's 
secular purpose analysis utilized the Lemon test, but explained that 
the purpose analysis in that test is meant to assure government 
neutrality between religions "and between religion and 
nonreligion.,,221 The Court then applied endorsement analysis, 
explaining that when government favors religion or a particular 
religion, it sends a message to "non adherents 'that they are 
outsiders,' not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
212. [d. at 2739. 
213. [d. at 2730-31. 
214. [d. at 2731. 
215. See id. at 2739-41. 
216. See id. 
217. [d. at 2727. 
218. See id. 
219. [d. at 2732. 
220. See id. at 2732-42. 
221. [d. at 2733. 
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members" of the political community.222 
The majority rejected the counties' invitation to reject or 
minimize the secular purpose test. Explaining why analysis of 
secular purpose is pOl?sible and not simply an exercise in getting into 
government actors' heads, Justice Souter wrote, "[t]he eyes that look 
to purpose belong to an 'objective observer,' one who takes account of 
the traditional external signs that show up in the 'text, legislative 
history, and implementation of the statute,' or comparable official 
t ,,223 ac. 
According to the Court, if an objective observer would perceive 
the predominant purpose behind a government action as religious, 
the government is "taking religious sides.,,224 In determining what 
an objective observer would perceive, the history and context of the 
display-of which the observer is presumed to be aware-are quite 
. rt t 225 lmpo an. 
The Court recognized that the Stone court had found the 
Commandments to be an "instrument of religion," and that this was 
decisive under the facts in that case.226 Still, the Court held that 
there is no per se rule against displaying the Ten Commandments.227 
At this point in the opinion the analysis gets quite interesting, 
at least in relation to the points made in this Article. Justice Souter 
acknowledged the theological significance of the Commandments 
and the impact of their divine origin.228 In so doing, he pointed out 
that the text of the Commandments is a powerful indication of their 
religious nature and the likely religious purpose in displaying 
them.229 The opinion noted that where the text is absent, it is less 
likely that an observer will perceive the depiction of tablets, etc., as 
religious.23o Conversely, when the text is present, "the insistence of 
the religious message is hard to avoid" absent a context that 
suggests "a message going beyond an excuse to promote [a] religious 
point ofview.,,231 As a result, when the government places the text of 
the Commandments "alone in public view," as the counties did in the 
first of the three displays, the religious purpose is obvious.232 
Moreover, surrounding the text with other historical documents, 
222. [d. 
223. [d. at 2734. 
224. [d. at 2735. 
225. [d. at 2734-37. 
226. [d. at 2737-38. 
227. [d. 
228. [d. at 2738-39. 
229. [d. 
230. [d. 
231. [d. 
232. [d. at 2739. 
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whose main connection is that they contain religious references, 
would only make a reasonable observer more likely to perceive a 
1. . 233 re IglOus purpose. 
The counties' third display, which included a number of secular 
documents in addition to the text of the Ten Commandments, was 
ostensibly intended to represent the foundations of American law.234 
The Court recognized that in a vacuum such a display might have a 
secular purpose,235 but in light of the history of the courthouse 
displays and the odd choices of historical documents-including the 
Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence but not the 
Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendmene36-the displays could 
not survive secular purpose analysis.237 The Court found especially 
odd the attempts to link the Ten Commandments, which are of 
divine origin, with the Declaration of Independence, which derives 
governmental power from the people.238 
The Court held that neutrality, although an elusive and 
variable concept, is an important focus of the religion clauses 
because the framers were concerned about the civic divisiveness 
that can be caused when the government takes sides in religious 
debates.239 This militates against the constitutionality of 
government displays that evince a religious purpose.240 Because 
there are historical arguments that support both sides, the Court 
rejected the dissent's brand of strict originalism. Additionally, given 
the long line of precedent recognizing neutrality as a guiding 
principle, the Court did not find the dissent's reading of history 
. 241 persuaSIve. 
Justice O'Connor, who joined the majority, filed a concurring 
opinion.242 She argued that, given the religious divisiveness in 
nations without some level of separation and given the success of 
the American experiment with separation-both for religion and 
society more generally-it makes little sense to reject core 
Establishment Clause principles and allow the government to favor 
one religion or set of religions over others or over non-religion.243 
She cited to the American tradition of religious voluntarism and 
233. See id. 
234. Id. 
235. See id. at 2741. 
236. Id. at 2740-4l. 
237. Id. at 2739-4l. 
238. Id. at 2740-4l. 
239. Id. at 2742-43. 
240. Id. at 2743-45. 
241. Id. at 2744. 
242. Id. at 2746 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
243. Id. 
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wrote that when government endorses one religious tradition or 
another, it can distort the marketplace of ideas and foster 
divisiveness.244 Displays such as those in McCreary County violate 
h d . '1 245 teen orsement prmclp e. 
Justice Scalia filed a strongly worded dissent, which was joined 
by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist and in part by 
Justice Kennedy.246 Justice Scalia relied on originalist arguments to 
assert that the government can endorse monotheistic religious 
traditions so long as it does not discriminate against other religious 
views or play favorites in terms of funding or other aid. 247 Justice 
Scalia pointed to statements and actions by various Framers and a 
number of historical practices endorsing monotheism.248 
As Justice Souter pointed out, Justice Scalia's history is quite 
selective because it leaves out other historical information that may 
suggest support for a broader separation or a preference for specific 
Protestant religious views rather than monotheism broadly.249 
Justice Kennedy did not join this portion of the dissenting opinion. 
Justice Scalia also criticized the majority for its focus on secular 
purpose, arguing that determining legislative purpose is not a 
fruitful task for the judiciary, as a purpose analysis can cause a 
great deal of mischief.250 Justice Scalia looked to government 
coercion or government action that proselytizes or disparages a 
particular religion(s).251 He found such coercion or disparagement 
lacking in this case and in all cases involving "passive" religious 
d · 1 252 ISP ays. 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia did acknowledge the religious 
nature of the Ten Commandments, but he morphed them into some 
sort of nonsectarian, monotheistic acknowledgment of a common 
heritage. 253 This ignores the power and significance of the choice to 
use the King James version of the Commandments, but at least 
Justice Scalia is forthright about the religious nature of the 
Commandments themselves. Unfortunately, like the majority, he 
does little to openly discuss the implications of the religious nature 
of the object. It is interesting, given his rejection of endorsement-
244. [d. at 2746~47. 
245. [d. at 2747. 
246. [d. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
247. [d. at 2748-49. 
248. [d. at 2748-53. 
249. Justice Souter, while acknowledging these problems, goes on to rely on 
originalist arguments himself. [d. at 2743-45. 
250. [d. at 2757-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
251. [d. at 2761-62. 
252. [d. at 2762. 
253. [d. at 2759-63. 
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type analysis, that Justice Scalia argued that the context of the 
displays dispel any argument that they lack a secular purpose.254 
Rather, he argued that the displays manifest a purpose to recognize 
the influence of the Commandments on American law and the long-
standing and common practices of the nation.255 
Van Orden and McCreary County, though decided the same day, 
seem to conflict with each other.256 Van Orden is a split decision; 
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the plurality. Significantly, 
there are four Justices in the plurality and four dissenting 
Justices.257 Thus, Justice Breyer's opinion concurring in the 
judgment seems to be the key opinion. This is quite similar to the 
famous Bakke case,258 where the Court was split four-four and 
Justice Powell's concurring opinion became the key precedent.259 
Unfortunately, Justice Breyer's opinion seems more a policy 
compromise than a guidepost for future courts, albeit a reasonable 
policy compromise.260 Before addressing Justice Breyer's 
concurrence, however, it is useful to address the plurality opinion. 
The case involved the display of a Ten Commandments 
monument on the ground between the Texas State Capitol and 
Supreme Court building. 261 The monument was one of many 
monuments scattered around the grounds of the Capitol.262 Its 
location did not call to it any special attention. The monument was 
donated in 1961 by the Fraternal Order of Eagles, who paid the cost 
of its erection.263 There was little evidence of the legislative intent 
behind accepting the monument, and no evidence of the religiously 
motivated purpose evident in McCreary County.264 
The plurality OpInIOn begins by asserting that the 
Establishment Clause has a dual nature. It recognizes both "the 
strong role played by religion and religious traditions throughout 
our [nlation's history" and that "governmental intervention in 
religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom.,,265 The 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (plurality opinion); 
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. 2722. 
257. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas were in the plurality; Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, 
O'Connor, and Souter dissented). 
258. Regents ofUniv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
259. Id. at 268-72. 
260. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
261. Id. at 2858. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 2858, 2864 n.ll. 
265. Id. at 2859. 
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plurality applies analysis quite similar to that applied in Lynch; it 
does not apply either the Lemon or the endorsement tests.266 
Thus, the plurality focuses on the "unbroken history of official 
acknowledgments by all three branches of government of the role of 
religion in American life ... " as asserted in Lynch.267 The opinion 
then recites several historical examples that support this 
proposition and cites Marsh v. Chambers268 and Lynch in 
combination with dicta from other cases.269 The opinion next 
discusses the religious monuments and sculptures adorning federal 
buildings in the District of Columbia, including the United Satates 
Supreme Court. This is all used as evidence that the Ten 
Commandments can have a secular meaning as well as a religious 
meaning: the decalogue's historical role in American law and 
culture.270 Significantly, this seems to conflict with the Court's 
earlier holding in Stone,271 but the plurality distinguishes Stone 
since it involved public schools, where courts generally apply 
heightened Establishment Clause analysis.272 
From the perspective of this Article, there are two especially 
significant aspects of the plurality opinion. First, it repeats the 
argument from Lynch that religious objects can be "passive.,,273 
Second, it creates an artificial dualism like that in Lynch, which 
suggests that monuments such as the one in Texas can have "a dual 
significance, partaking of both religion and government.,,274 The 
argument seems to be that so long as the monument "partakes" of 
an appropriate secular "significance," the religious "significance," 
while still there, is somehow sterilized for Establishment Clause 
purposes.275 As explained elsewhere in this Article, that argument is 
flawed. The dual nature suggested by the plurality may, however, 
be a recognition of the fact that Ten Commandments displays are 
multifaceted.276 
Justice Scalia filed a short concurring opinion referencing his 
dissent in McCreary County.277 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring 
opinion repeating his call in earlier cases to reevaluate incorporation 
266. [d. at 2861-64. 
267. [d. at 286l. 
268. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
269. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861-62. 
270. [d. at 2862-63. 
271. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1981) (per curiam). 
272. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863-64. 
273. [d. at 2861, 2864. 
274. [d. at 2864. 
275. See generally id. 
276. See supra Part V. 
277. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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of the Establishment Clause,278 and arguing that, to the extent that 
it is incorporated, the touchstone of Establishment Clause analysis 
should be legal coercion.279 A refreshing aspect of Justice Thomas' 
opinion is that he openly acknowledges and engages with the 
religious nature of religious objects,280 even if the conclusions he 
draws from that engagement are questionable.281 In relation to Elk 
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,282 which involved the 
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, and the religious 
objects cases, Justice Thomas wrote: 
Telling either nonbelievers or believers that the words "under 
God" have no meaning contradicts what they know to be true. 
Moreover, repetition does not deprive religious words or 
symbols of their traditional meaning . . .. Even when this 
Court's precedents recognize the religious meaning of symbols 
or words, that recognition fails to respect fully religious belief 
d· b l' f283 or IS e Ie . 
Justice Thomas goes on to point out that the Court's 
endorsement approach "either gives insufficient weight to the views 
of non adherents and adherents alike, or it provides no principled 
way to choose between those views.,,284 Unfortunately, rather than 
analyze how the nature of religious symbols speaks to their 
constitutionality from the perspective of the object, Justice Thomas 
ends up relying on his view of the intent of the framers to find the 
display of such objects constitutional.285 Thus, while he comes close 
to seriously engaging the power of these objects, he, like the other 
Justices, falls back into a contested doctrinal argument, in this case 
one based on history. 
Several themes emerge in Justice Breyer's concurring opinion. 
First, Justice Breyer views this as a "borderline" case to which no 
legal test can be appropriately applied.286 This leaves only the 
"exercise of legal judgment" for determining the outcome.287 Justice 
Breyer stresses, however, that such legal judgment is "not a 
personal judgment;" "[r]ather ... it must reflect and remain faithful 
278. Id. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 2866-67. 
281. Id. at 2865-68. 
282. 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (holding that plaintiff Newdow lacked standing, and, 
thus, never reaching the Pledge issue). 
283. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2866-67 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
284. Id. at 2867. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
287. Id. at 2869. 
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to the underlying purposes of the clauses, and it must take account 
of context and consequences measured in light of those purposes.,,288 
Second, Justice Breyer, like the plurality, writes that the purpose of 
the Establishment Clause is to maintain some level of separation 
between church and state while avoiding hostility to religion, 
although it seems clear that Justice Breyer weighs these factors 
differently than the plurality.289 Third, Justice Breyer asserts that 
avoiding religious divisiveness is a major goal of the Establishment 
Clause, but that this can cut both ways.290 Therefore, the type of 
religious purpose evidenced in McCreary County is unconstitutional, 
but attempts by the "government to purge from the public sphere all 
that in any way partakes of the religious" would be as well.291 
Fourth, Justice Breyer argues that longstanding religious displays 
do not generally raise the same Establishment Clause concerns as 
new attempts to display religious objects because the longstanding 
displays are less likely to be divisive, assuming their context and 
purpose adequately secularizes them.292 This seems to be an 
attempt to protect against Establishment Clause challenges of most 
longstanding government displays that include religious themes-
recognition of a form of symbolic ceremonial deism, if you will. 
Unfortunately, like the plurality-in fact, even more so than the 
plurality-Justice Breyer argues for a dualistic (or triadic) analysis 
of the symbolic meaning of the Ten Commandments. He argues that 
the Commandments, while religious, can also represent "a secular 
moral message," and, in some contexts, "a historical message.,,293 He 
uses these potential secular messages, in light of the physical and 
historical context of the monument, to argue that the display in this 
case was meant to reflect Texas' moral and historical traditions and 
not the religious aspects of the display.294 Thus, like the plurality, 
Justice Breyer seems to recognize the Ten Commandments' 
multifaceted nature without seriously considering the impact of the 
religious facets of the monument. Like the plurality, he essentially 
argues that the religious aspects of the monument, while there, are 
appropriately desacrilized.295 Even as he argues that no legal test 
can be applied to borderline cases, Breyer engages in an 
endorsement-like analysis, unlike the plurality.296 Justice Breyer 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at 2868-69. 
290. Id. at 287l. 
291. Id. at 2868, 287l. 
292. Id. at 2871. 
293. Id. at 2869-70. 
294. Id. at 2869-7l. 
295. Id. 
296. See id. (analyzing the context of the display to determine the message it 
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rejects most of the plurality's reasoning and seems to carve out a 
narrow group of cases involving longstanding religious monuments 
or displays whose physical and historical context make them appear 
less divisive than they may appear in other historical or physical 
settings. 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion that focuses heavily 
on the religious nature of the Ten Commandments and, more 
importantly, takes the question of the Commandments' religiosity 
seriously.297 He, like Justice Thomas, does not believe that context 
can detract from the religious meaning of the Commandments, at 
least not when the full text of the Commandments are displayed.29B 
He also points out the intense theological disputes that can arise in 
relation to the choice of text for the Commandments. Like the 
majority in McCreary County, Justice Stevens focuses heavily on the 
concepts of neutrality and separation.299 He expresses great concern 
about the potential divisiveness of a display with such obvious 
theological significance. In light of that theological significance, he 
distinguishes displays of the Ten Commandments that focus on the 
Commandments' text from other displays with religious content that 
the Court has upheld.30o In his view, such displays inherently create 
religious insiders and outsiders and thus violate the neutrality and 
separation principles.30I 
Justice Stevens also attacks the plurality (and Justice Scalia's 
McCreary County dissent) for relying on isolated statements of the 
Framers and on the Framers' contemporary practices. He notes that 
persuasive evidence exists to counter that history with a more 
separationist version and that the sectarian nature of a Ten 
Commandments display has little to do with the practices supported 
by history and the nation's longstanding traditions regarding public 
acknowledgment of religion.302 Essentially, he rejects the hard-
originalist approach as being indeterminate and the tradition 
approach as being irrelevant under these facts. 303 He also notes that 
if one wanted to take a true hard-originalist approach, it would be 
possible to support religious discrimination and favoritism by the 
states against non-Protestants (and against many Protestant groups 
as well).304 Justice Stevens comes closest to taking the "religious" in 
sends). 
297. Id. at 2873 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
298. Id. at 2874-82. 
299. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 2874-75. 
302. Id. at 2882-90. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 2886-87. 
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religious objects seriously, but his analysis remains external to the 
objects and, thus, differs from that suggested in this Article.305 
Justice O'Connor filed a short concurrence cross-referencing her 
concurrence in McCreary County and stating her general agreement 
with Justice Souter's dissenting opinion.306 Justice Souter wrote a 
dissenting opinion arguing that the context of the Texas display, 
especially the fact that the full text of the Commandments appear 
on the monument, demonstrates a form of religious favoritism that 
violates the neutrality principle (and implicitly endorses religion).307 
He argues that unless context alters the message, government 
cannot display "an obviously religious text" consistently with the 
neutrality principle.30B Justice Souter looks at the Fraternal Order 
of Eagles's purpose in donating the monument, the State's purpose 
for placing it on the capitol grounds, and the physical attributes of 
the monument-which included sizing and capitalizing words that 
reinforce the most religious aspects of the text-and concludes that 
the state was clearly sending a religious message by displaying the 
monument.3D9 He rejects the State's arguments that the purpose 
was to recognize the Commandments' role as a foundation of secular 
law in Texas and the nation as a whole.3lD In this regard, Justice 
Souter notes that the Ten Commandments are a divine injunction to 
follow the laws stated therein, and that the monument was designed 
to accentuate the divine.3ll 
Although the monument was physically placed on the twenty-
two acre capitol grounds with sixteen other monuments, because the 
monuments have no common theme, the Commandments' message 
is not altered.312 Justice Souter does argue, however, that Ten 
Commandments displays-especially those not including the text of 
the Commandments-would be constitutional if they were 
appropriately contextualized by other objects to suggest that the 
total display is about the historical role of the Commandments in 
western law.313 He chides the plurality for relying on generalities in 
earlier cases rather than on more relevant cases such as Stone,314 
and he argues that the plurality's attempt to limit Stone to the 
305. Id. at 2873-90. 
306. Id. at 2891 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
307. Id. at 2892 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 2893. 
310. Id. at 2895-96. 
311. Id. at 2893. 
312. Id. at 2895. 
313. Id. at 2893-94. 
314. Id. at 2895-96. 
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classroom setting was against the lessons of that case and others.315 
Although the law relating to public display of religious objects 
by government entities seems uncertain after McCreary County and 
Van Orden, some things are clear. For example, if the display does 
not have a secular purpose, it is unconstitutional because a majority 
of the Court in McCreary County held that the secular purpose 
prong of the Lemon test (as merged with a focus on endorsement) 
applies to these monuments. But what if there is an adequate 
secular purpose or the purpose is not clear? Would the Court apply 
the effects test or the tradition approach ofthe Van Orden plurality? 
Clearly the Van Orden plurality would apply the tradition approach, 
but it is unclear whether Justice Breyer would do so in cases that 
are not "borderline," and, of course, Justice Breyer did not agree 
with the bulk of the plurality opinion. Meanwhile, the four 
dissenting Justices in Van Orden would apply something resembling 
the endorsement test to the effects of the Ten Commandments 
monument. 
Significantly, dicta in McCreary County seems to support this 
approach. It would seem that Justice Breyer's concurrence in Van 
Orden is the key, but unfortunately Justice Breyer's opinion is not 
terribly concrete. He does hint, however, that considerations central 
to Lemon and endorsement analysis, such as physical context, might 
be relevant when a case is not ''borderline.'' Therefore, it appears 
that a majority of the Court would apply the Lemon test and/or the 
endorsement test, or something resembling these tests, to the effects 
of government-supported Ten Commandments displays. So 
questions regarding the physical and historical context of a given 
display will most likely continue to be relevant in religious 
symbolism cases, and the risks of undervaluing or overvaluing the 
religious nature of certain objects will remain. 
Two recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit demonstrate the important role context can 
play in cases involving government use or display of the Ten 
Commandments. In King v. Richmond County,3lS the Eleventh 
Circuit upheld the use of a small county seal with a picture of the 
Ten Commandments on it. The seal did not contain the text of the 
Commandments,317 and no one in the county knew why the 
Commandments icon was included in the seal because it had been 
created in the late nineteenth century.3lB There was some 
315. Id. at 2896-97. 
316. 331 F.3d 1271,1273-74,1286 (11th Cir. 2003). 
317. Id. at 1274. The seal depicted the Roman numerals I-X but not the text 
of the Commandments. Id. 
318. Id. The seal had been used "for more than 130 years," but no one knew 
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speculation that it was meant to symbolize law; the seal was 
generally used to authenticate legal documents and when it was 
developed, many citizens were illiterate.319 The court applied the 
Lemon test as augmented by the Endorsement test, and thus 
inquired as to whether the primary purpose or effect of the seal was 
to endorse religion. Entanglement was not an issue in the case.320 
The court discussed in detail the importance of physical context in 
religious symbolism cases, and held that in context the seal neither 
had the purpose nor the effect of endorsing religion given its size, 
placement, use, the inclusion of secular symbols in the seal, and the 
fact that the seal did not include the Ten Commandments' text.321 
The seal does seem to have much less "sacred" connotation than 
some of the Ten Commandments displays discussed below. The fact 
that the text of the Commandments was not included could 
potentially affect whether the seal is viewed as a religious object.322 
The test proposed later in this Article suggests that the seal is 
constitutional, but for different reasons than those expressed in the 
decision.323 
In Glassroth v. Moore,324 the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court's placement of a large 
granite Ten Commandments monument in the Rotunda of the state 
courthouse violated the Establishment Clause.325 Former Chief 
Justice Roy Moore installed the monument in the middle of the 
night while a film crew from Coral Ridge ministries, an Evangelical 
Christian group, filmed the installation.326 The monument was 
topped with the full text of the King James version of the Ten 
Commandments in tablet form; all other text was smaller and below 
the Ten Commandments.327 
Former Chief Justice Moore never consulted the other Justices 
before installing the monument,328 and he refused to remove the 
monument when ordered to do so by a federal court.329 Significantly, 
former Chief Justice Moore made several statements demonstrating 
the "purpose for the seal's design." [d. 
319. [d. at 1277. 
320. [d. at 1276-86. 
321. [d. at 1277-86. 
322. [d. at 1285-86. 
323. See infra Part VI. 
324. 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003). 
325. As a result of this behavior, Moore was removed from the bench in 
November 2003. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Alabama Judge is Removed, WASH. 
POST., Nov. 14,2003, at A-Ol. 
326. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1286. 
327. [d. at 1285-86. 
328. [d. at 1285. 
329. [d. at 1288. 
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his view that the monument was a religious object.33o The case 
received a great deal of media attention, but as a matter of 
constitutional law, the case was easy to decide; former Chief Justice 
Moore's behavior erased any doubt that his purpose in erecting the 
monument was to promote religion, specifically Christianity.33l 
Moreover, given the circumstances surrounding the monument's 
installation, its location, and its context in the courthouse, the effect 
of the monument was to endorse Christianity.332 Thus, the court, 
analyzing the effects prong through the lens of the endorsement 
test, held that the monument violated the first two prongs of the 
Lemon test.333 While former Justice Moore's problematic behavior 
drew a lot of attention to this case, Glassroth is not by itself the best 
case for analyzing the constitutionality of Ten Commandments 
displays. Mter McCreary County, this case is an even easier 
example because of the obvious lack of a secular purpose.334 
In Adland u. Russ,335 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit struck down a Kentucky legislative resolution 
requiring that a Ten Commandments monument be moved from 
storage to the grounds of the Kentucky Capitol as part of a 
"historical and cultural display" in which "the Ten Commandments 
monument physically dominat[ed]" the display.336 The Fraternal 
Order of Eagles donated the monument to the state in 1971, and it 
was displayed at the Capitol until 1980, when it was placed in 
storage during construction on the Capitol grounds.337 The 
resolution, which also included quotes from various historical 
sources referencing G-d or the Bible, required that the monument be 
put back on the Capitol grounds.33B The court held that the 
resolution did not have a secular legislative purpose and that the 
placement of the monument on the Capitol pursuant to the 
resolution would be an endorsement of religion.339 Significantly, the 
court noted that government displays of the Ten Commandments do 
not automatically violate the Constitution. A display that was not 
dominated by the Ten Commandments and that included a variety 
of other legal or historical documents, thus providing an 
330. [d. at 1286-87. 
331. [d. at 1296-97. 
332. [d. at 1297. 
333. [d. at 1296-97. 
334. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
335. 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002). 
336. [d. at 487. 
337. [d. at 475-76. 
338. [d. at 476-77. 
339. [d. at 479-84. 
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appropriately secular context, might be constitutiona1.34o Dicta in 
McCreary County would seem to support this conclusion. Judge 
Batchelder dissented, arguing that the case was not yet ripe.341 
In Books v. City of Elkhart,342 the Seventh Circuit likewise 
addressed a situation involving a Ten Commandments monument 
that was placed on government property after having been donated 
by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.343 The monument was donated to 
the City of Elkhart in 1958 and was placed on the grounds of the 
city municipal building.344 The case includes an interesting 
historical discussion about the evolution of the program through 
which the Fraternal Order of Eagles donated such monuments to 
government entities around the country.345 The Court reiterated the 
holding in Stone v. Graham346 that the Ten Commandments are 
unmistakably a religious symbo1.347 It then held that the context of 
the display, including the religious nature of the speeches given 
when it was erected in 1958, demonstrated that there was no 
secular purpose for the display. The court rejected the secular 
purpose espoused by the City "on the eve of' the litigation.348 
Moreover, the court held that the primary effect of the monument 
was to endorse religion.349 Because the monument stood 
permanently on the grounds of the municipal building, the seat of 
the city government, and its context in no way detracted from its 
religious message to non-adherents, its tenure on prominent city 
property did not alter this religious effect.350 Judge Manion 
concurred in part and dissented in part, disagreeing with the 
majority's analysis under the Lemon test.351 
Similarly, in ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. City of 
Plattsmouth,352 a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that Plattsmouth, Nebraska's display of a Ten 
Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles in 1965 was unconstitutiona1.353 The display was located in a 
340. Id. at 489-90. 
341. Id. at 490 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
342. 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000). 
343. Id. 
344. Id. at 295. 
345. Id. at 294-95 (noting that the program was influenced by filmmaker 
Cecil B. DeMille, among others). 
346. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). 
347. Books, 235 F.3d at 302. 
348. Id. at 304. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. at 304-07. 
351. Id. at 311 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
352. 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated by 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005). 
353. Id. at 1020. 
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city park, and the court held that the monument violated both the 
purpose and effects prongs of the Lemon test.354 Under Eighth 
Circuit precedent, the endorsement "test" is a gloss on the effects 
prong of Lemon, and thus a finding that the monument had an 
impermissible effect also demonstrated that the monument 
d d 1·· 355 en orse re IglOn. 
Unlike Books, the record contained none of the facts 
surrounding the donation or erection of Plattsmouth's monument. 
There was, however, evidence that the city maintained the 
monument and reinstalled it after it was toppled in 2001.356 The 
court found that given the inherently religious nature of the Ten 
Commandments, the City could not have had a secular purpose for 
initially installing and maintaining the monument.357 The court also 
held that the primary effect of the monument was to endorse 
religion.35s The court considered the broader context of the 
monument, which included the fact that it was the only monument 
in its general area in the park and the only park monument with a 
religious theme.359 The court rejected the City's argument that the 
display was constitutional under Marsh v. Chambers360 because 
unlike legislative prayer, government display of Ten 
Commandments monuments is not a longstanding and ubiquitous 
practice.361 This holding would seem to be in tension with the 
plurality opinion in Van Orden, but under Justice Breyer's 
concurring opinion in that case, the other factors considered 
relevant by the City of Plattsmouth court might support the 
conclusion that the Plattsmouth's monument was unconstitutional. 
Judge Arnold concurred with the court's analysis and holding 
under Lemon,362 but would have also held (unlike the majority) that 
the display discriminated in favor of Christianity and Judaism in 
violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Larson v. Valente. 363 
Judge Bowman dissented from the court's analysis under Lemon 
and would have upheld the display of the monument as consistent 
with the Establishment Clause.364 The Eighth Circuit has agreed to 
354. [d. at 1034-42. 
355. [d. at 1040-4l. 
356. [d. at 1026. 
357. [d. at 1036-38. 
358. [d. at 1041-42. 
359. [d. at 1040-4l. 
360. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
361. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1042. 
362. [d. at 1042-43 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
363. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
364. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d at 1043 (Bowman, J., concurring in part 
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hear this case en banc and has thus vacated the opinion,365 but the 
reasoning in the opinion-especially regarding the religious nature 
of the Ten Commandments-remains relevant to the discussion 
here. 
Freethought Society v. Chester County presented a different 
factual context for the display of the Ten Commandments.366 In 
Freethought Society, the Ten Commandments were on a plaque that 
was placed near the old entrance of the county courthouse. The 
plaque was installed on the courthouse in 1920 and remained there 
for eighty-two years.367 The courthouse, but not the plaque, was 
placed on the National Register of Historic Places.36s The entrance 
where the plaque was located was closed in 2001 in favor of an 
entrance that was part of a newer addition to the building.369 This 
was done for security and efficiency reasons.370 Evidence suggested 
that the City had made little effort to maintain or call attention to 
the plaque since its 1920 dedication.371 There were a few smaller 
plaques and signs in the same general area.372 The long history and 
now relatively isolated location of the plaque were highly relevant to 
the court's decision.373 
In analyzing the purpose of the plaque, the court held that it 
had to analyze the City's purpose for not removing the plaque in 
2001.374 The City's stated purpose in 2001 was the historical 
preservation of the building. The court found that historical 
preservation was an adequate secular purpose given the 
longstanding history of the plaque and the building and the fact that 
the City had done nothing to call attention to the plaque.375 It also 
relied on the argument that the city commissioners viewed the Ten 
Commandments as a "foundational legal document." According to 
the court, this augmented the secular purpose of historic 
t · 376 preserva IOn. 
The court also applied the endorsement test to gauge the effects 
of the plaque and held that the plaque was not an unconstitutional 
and dissenting in part). 
365. See supra note 353. 
366. 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003). 
367. Id. at 249-50. 
368. Id. at 253. 
369. Id. at 250, 253. 
370. Id. at 253-54. 
371. Id. at 252. 
372. Id. at 254. 
373. Id. at 256-69. 
374. Id. at 261-62. 
375. Id. at 267-69. 
376. Id. at 268. 
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endorsement of religion.377 In applying the endorsement test, the 
court "adopted" Justice O'Connor's view that the reasonable 
observer under that test is "presumed to have an understanding of 
the general history of the display and the community in which it is 
displayed . . . .',378 Thus, a reasonable Chester County resident 
observing the plaque would know that the plaque had been there for 
over eighty years, was not erected by recent administrations, and 
that the city did not call attention to the plaque. Also relevant to 
the reasonable observer would be the current context of the display, 
which was no longer at the main entrance.379 Based on its history 
and physical context, the court held that the county could keep the 
plaque on the courthouse building.380 
The Tenth Circuit addressed the Ten Commandments 
monument issue in a different context in Summum v. City of 
Ogden. 381 The City of Ogden, Utah erected a Ten Commandments 
monument on the lawn outside the city municipal building.382 The 
monument had been donated in 1966 by, you guessed it, the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles.383 In this case, Summum, a religious 
group, asked to erect its own monument near the Ten 
Commandments monument.384 When the city declined, Summum 
sued, arguing that the Ten Commandments monument violated the 
Establishment Clause and that the denial of the request to erect 
their own monument constituted viewpoint discrimination under the 
Free Speech Clause.385 On appeal, Summum conceded the 
Establishment Clause issue because of an earlier Tenth Circuit 
decision that seemed to directly undermine its claim.386 
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit suggested in a footnote that this 
concession may have been unnecessary.387 As a result of the 
concession, the case was decided on free speech grounds. 
The City argued that the Ten Commandments monument was 
the City's own speech and not that of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, 
and thus it was not engaging in viewpoint discrimination by 
maintaining the Ten Commandments monument and denying the 
Summum's request to erect the other monument.388 The court 
377. [d. 
378. [d. at 259. 
379. Id. at 262-67. 
380. [d. at 266-67,269-70. 
381. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002). 
382. [d. at 997-98. 
383. [d. 
384. [d. at 998. 
385. [d. at 999. 
386. [d. at 999-1000. 
387. [d. at 1000 n.3. 
388. [d. at 1003. 
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disagreed, citing evidence that the monument did not clearly 
constitute the City's own speech and thus the denial of requests to 
erect monuments by other religious groups constituted viewpoint 
discrimination favoring the Christian or Judeo-Christian viewpoint 
or disfavoring other religious viewpoints.3s9 In an unusually ironic 
move, the City attempted to defend itself against the claim of 
viewpoint discrimination by arguing that it had a compelling 
interest to exclude the Summum monument: avoidance of an 
Establishment Clause violation.390 
The irony of the City's position-i.e., that despite its erection of 
the Ten Commandments monument, it would violate the 
Establishment Clause if it allowed the other monument-was not 
lost on the court. The court rejected the City's claim that the Ten 
Commandments monument was different because the city had the 
right to erect monuments that reflected the general values of its 
citizens, and held that the City did not have a compelling interest 
for excluding the Summum monument from what the court had 
implicitly found to be a limited public forum. 391 Whether such a 
forum existed under the facts, and whether the Ten Commandments 
monument really constituted the Eagles' speech rather than the 
city's, are questionable, but since the court was not faced with the 
Establishment Clause question (except as a defense to viewpoint 
discrimination), the implications of the free speech holding for 
future Ten Commandments monument cases is unclear. The Van 
Orden plurality might suggest that the City could post the Ten 
Commandments as its own speech while not posting other religious 
objects, but since the Van Orden plurality did not address the free 
speech question, this is unclear. 
There have been other recent cases involving Ten 
Commandments displays,392 but the discussion above highlights the 
variety of factors and analytical approaches that courts have used in 
these cases. The important thing for present purposes is that Ten 
389. Id. at 1004-06. 
390. Id. at 1009-1I. 
391. Id. at 1006-09. 
392. A number of these cases involve attempts to post the Ten 
Commandments in public schools. For example, ACLU v. McCreary County, 
354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 310 (2004), involved an 
attempt to post the Ten Commandments along with other documents in public 
schools as well as in the courthouse. See also Baker v. Adams County/Ohio 
Valley Sch. Bd., 310 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2002) (involving Ten Commandments 
displays in public schools); cf Indiana Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 
F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the Establishment Clause was 
violated where the state accepted a Ten Commandments monument and 
displayed it on the grounds of the statehouse). 
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Commandments displays have been characterized in different ways 
by different courts (and sometimes in different ways by the same 
court). Thus, they have been characterized as purely religious, as 
multifaceted, and as secularized by their context. As will be seen, 
most Ten Commandments monuments are multifaceted.393 The 
various characterizations of such monuments are evidence of their 
multifaceted nature. This will be explored further in Parts V and 
VI. 
E. Christmas Trees and Other Holiday Displays 
The constitutionality of government displays of Christmas trees 
and other similar holiday displays was essentially resolved by Lynch 
and Allegheny, where the Court presumed such displays were 
constitutional. 394 The opinions of the Court in both cases scarcely 
questioned the constitutionality of Christmas trees and objects such 
as Santas, elves, and plastic reindeer.395 Even Justice Brennan's 
partial concurrence in Allegheny, which suggests that a Christmas 
tree can have significant religious meaning in some contexts, seems 
to assume that a Christmas tree by itself is not a religious object.396 
Lower courts have followed suit. Such analysis-or lack thereof-is 
bl t · 397 pro ema IC. 
The next section will address some common critiques of the 
legal doctrine in religious symbolism cases. After that, the Article 
will focus on the problems inherent in treating religious objects as 
legal subjects. This will be followed by discussion of a proposed legal 
test that might account for some of the concerns that arise when 
religious objects become legal subjects. 
IV. CRITIQUES OF THE PREVAILING LEGAL DOCTRINES 
The doctrine developed by the Court in religious symbolism 
cases has been the subject of intense criticism. While this criticism 
is quite rich and diverse, it generally falls into one (or more) of four 
broad categories: the artificial secularization critique; the 
majoritarian dominance critique; the contextual critique; and the 
traditionalism critique. Moreover, scholars have questioned the 
efficacy of both the endorsement test and broader investigations of 
393. See infra Parts V, VI. 
394. See generally County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687 (1984). 
395. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687. 
396. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
397. See infra Part V. 
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the "message(s) sent" by a given government action.398 To the extent 
the latter critiques connect with the four broad criticisms discussed 
herein, they will be included in this discussion, but given this 
Article's general ambivalence toward the endorsement test, the 
critiques focused on that test itself are not as relevant. 
For present purposes, it is important to point out that this 
Article asserts that each of the four broad critiques is valid, but that 
the problems that arise in religious symbolism cases are inherent to 
reflexively treating religious objects as legal subjects. The way in 
which the Court has analyzed such objects only worsens the 
situation and gives added validity to the critiques. Of course, these 
critiques are not necessarily separate, and many commentators have 
used a combination of some or all of the critiques. This Article 
asserts, however, that the critiques are nothing more than a 
discussion of the effects of treating religious objects as legal subjects. 
The cause lies in deeper concerns that go to the very nature of 
religious objects and symbols and the very nature of judicial 
interpretation. Before reaching those concerns, it is worth briefly 
setting forth and exploring each of the critiques. 
A. The Artificial Secularization Critique 
The artificial secularization critique suggests that the Court's 
doctrine in religious symbolism cases leads to an artificial 
characterization of religious objects that eviscerates, ignores, or 
minimizes their religious nature and messages. 399 One might also 
refer to it as the "desacrilization critique." As Professor Steven 
Smith has pointed out, the Court never held in Lynch that the 
creche lost its religious nature by inclusion in a broader holiday 
display.40o Yet, those who have criticized the Court for its 
desacrilization of religious objects in the religious symbolism cases 
have a valid concern. 
While the Court did not hold that the creche in Lynch or the 
menorah in Allegheny were any less religious objects because of 
their inclusion in broader displays,401 it did hold that the religious 
messages sent by the objects were appropriately secularized.402 The 
idea that sacred objects can be robbed of their sacred meaning by 
398. See Smith, supra note 116, at 314 (questioning the efficacy of the 
endorsement test). 
399. Underkuffier-Freund, supra note 8, at 871-72,971-72 (condemning the 
Court's desacrilization of religious symbols); Zick, supra note 8 (criticizing the 
Court's desacrilization of religious symbols). 
400. Smith, supra note 117, at 1002-03. 
401. [d. 
402. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.s. 668 (1984). 
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placement in a broader display is not in keeping with the general 
understanding of the nature of religious objects and symbols.403 The 
plurality opinion in Van Orden, which asserts that objects can 
maintain their religious nature while also having a nonreligious 
nature,404 does not alleviate this critique because the plurality relies 
on Lynch-like reasoning and uses the dual nature of the object in a 
manner that essentially desacrilizes the Commandments.405 
Moreover, the fact that some people may not perceive a religious 
message in these contexts is not all that surprising since it is 
unlikely that everyone will fully perceive the religious power of the 
objects even without the added context of the broader display. 
An important aspect of this critique is that it can be used to 
attack both the opinion in Lynch and Justice O'Connor's application 
of the endorsement test.406 The critique suggests that focusing on 
the message sent by a display is problematic because religious 
objects may send different messages to nonbelievers and believers, 
as well as to religious outsiders and insiders.407 Looking at the 
message a given religious object sends will have a tendency to either 
privilege a secularized view in order to uphold the display or 
acknowledge the religious nature of the object, thus, in all 
likelihood, striking down the display.408 The critique would suggest 
that the latter is acceptable but the former is not.409 Of course, some 
who have advocated this critique would argue that recognizing the 
religious nature of a religious object does not necessitate a holding 
that the government may not display it.41o This is essentially Justice 
Scalia's argument in his dissenting opinion in McCreary County.411 
There are, of course, serious problems with the Court's attempt 
to use physical or thematic context to desacrilize a religious object or 
symbol.412 Religious objects and symbols hold powerful meaning for 
403. See supra Part II. 
404. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2863-64 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
405. Id. 
406. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668; id. at 690-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
407. Dolgin, supra note 11, at 497-98 ("[A] religious symbol, like any symbol, 
may have one set of meanings at one time, in one place or for one group, and 
other sets of meanings elsewhere or for other people."); Neil R. Feigenson, 
Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative 
to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 84 (1990) 
("The messages that words convey to a community depend on the contexts in 
which the community members receive the words."). 
408. See Smith, supra note 117, at 1002; Zick, supra note 8, at 2367. 
409. Zick, supra note 8, at 2370. 
410. Smith, supra note 117, at 1000-01. 
411. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748-50, 2758-64 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
412. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic 
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believers.413 Contrary to the Court's assertion in Lynch, they are not 
passive.414 Physical or thematic context cannot take away the deeply 
spiritual meaning that many devout Christians perceive when 
viewing a creche.415 At most, the believer might feel that the broader 
context of a creche demeans its sacred meaning when that context 
includes other objects, but that does not minimize the sacred 
meaning of the creche itself.416 The artificial secularization critique 
recognizes this fact and suggests that viewing religious displays 
through the "lowest" (secularized) common denominator demeans 
the religious nature of the objects displayed. This Article suggests 
that this is a byproduct of treating religious objects as legal subjects 
without first adequately considering what constitutes a religious 
object.417 The artificial secularization critique makes a lot of sense, 
but to the extent it views objects as sending messages to observers, 
as opposed to holding meaning with which observers can interact 
through the interpretive process, it mistakes the way in which the 
objects are interpreted by those who interact with them. 
B. The Majoritarian Dominance Critique 
The majoritarian dominance critique suggests that the Court's 
doctrine in religious symbolism cases minimizes the impact and 
message sent to religious outsiders and nonbelievers by government 
display of religious objects.418 The displays almost always represent 
objects of dominant, or at least less marginalized. religious groups, 
and thus the failure to find such displays unconstitutional in many 
circumstances amounts to a de facto establishment of majority 
religious preferences.419 A corollary of this critique suggests that it 
is not so much larger religious groups that benefit from the Court's 
approach, but rather the dominant secularized religious culture.420 
Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 492 (2005); Zick, supra note 
8, at 2368-74. 
413. See supra Part II. 
414. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
415. Dolgin, supra note 11, at 503-05; Hill, supra note 407; Zick, supra note 
8, at 2368-74. 
416. See supra Part II. 
417. See infra Part V. 
418. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 8, at 855-58 (criticizing the Court's 
minimization of the impact government display of religious objects can have on 
religious minorities); Karst, supra note 8, at 504-05 (arguing that religious 
minorities suffer when the government displays symbols of the majority 
religion). 
419. Brownstein, supra note 8, at 855-58; see also supra notes 162-65 and 
accompanying text. 
420. Cf. CARTER, supra note 84, at 94-95 (pointing out religious nature of the 
display of religious objects and the ridiculousness of treating them as though 
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This critique can be used in tandem with the artificial secularization 
critique, and it is not uncommon to read articles or dissenting 
opinions which suggest that the Court's approach in religious 
symbolism cases both demeans the religious nature of the symbols 
and disregards the messag~ such symbols send to nonbelievers and 
religious outsiders.421 
Interestingly, the concern underlying this critique-that the 
Court further marginalizes religious outsiders and nonbelievers by 
suggesting government displays of religious objects from the 
qominant faiths in a given area are constitutional-is played out in 
the Court's battles over the endorsement test.422 AB some 
commentators have suggested, the phrasing of that test held the 
initial promise of sensitivity to the impact of government religious 
activities on religious minorities, but the Court's subsequent 
application of the test, at least in the religious symbolism cases, has 
IlOt lived up to that promise.423 Critics frequently blame Justice 
O'Connor's adoption of the reasonable observer standard because 
her reasonable observer, who is charged with knowledge of local 
customs and settings, is quite similar to a member of the dominant 
r~ligious group in a given area.424 
This critique is reflected in the dispute between Justices 
O'Connor and Stevens in their respective opinions in Capitol Square 
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,425 in which they debate the 
perspective of the "reasonable observer" under the endorsement 
test.426 Justice Stevens would have made the reasonable observer a 
member of a religious outgroup or a nonbeliever, while Justice 
O'Connor would have used a more general reasonable observer 
!;ltandard that did not consider outsider perspectives as clearly.427 
Those espousing the majoritarian dominance critique generally 
either reject the use of the endorsement test or advocate an 
~pproach more in keeping with Justice Stevens' application of the 
they are not religious in a book addressing the cultural dominance of secular 
values in America). 
421. See Dolgin, supra note 11, at 498; Smith, supra note 117; Zick, supra 
note 8, at 2368-74. 
422. See supra note 418 and accompanying text. 
423. Coleman, supra note 116, at 489 (arguing that there are problems with 
Justice O'Connor's reasonable observer standard because it ignores the 
perspectives of "actual perceptions of real citizens"). 
424. Feigenson, supra note 407, at 87-88. 
425. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
426. [d. at 778-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
427. [d. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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endorsement test.428 
Of course, this critique is not limited to the Court's application 
of the endorsement test. In fact, the critique has an even more 
compelling application in relation to the "longstanding tradition" 
approach used by the Court in Lynch and Marsh and the plurality in 
Van Orden.429 After all, longstanding traditions rarely reflect the 
practices and beliefs of religious outsiders,43o and the fact that they 
have not been challenged may say more about the subordinated role 
of religious outsiders than it does about longstanding community 
acceptance of a given practice.431 Longstanding traditions that 
reflect religious dominance have been compared by some critics to 
the "longstanding tradition" of Jim Crow because in both cases the 
dominant group was able to control the perpetuation of the tradition 
while social mores helped silence objectors.432 
Finally, one of the most salient features of this critique is that 
in cases like Lynch, the physical and thematic context of the display, 
far from evincing a celebration of a secular holiday, reflects even 
further Christian dominance.433 This should seem an obvious 
critique since Christmas, or "Christ's Mass," is not celebrated in any 
form by most non-Christians, some smaller Christian groups, and 
many atheists.434 Far from sending a nonreligious message, the 
placement of Santas, reindeer, elves, and Christmas trees near a 
creche sends a message that Christianity is the preferred religion.435 
Rather than detracting from the religious meaning of the creche, 
these other figures reinforce that the display is about Christmas, 
which is not "our" holiday.436 The same message may be sent to 
Muslims, Buddhists, or atheists by a large Christmas tree, Menorah 
and sign saluting liberty-i.e., some outsiders might question whose 
liberty is being saluted by this display. 437 The declaration of 
Christmas as a national holiday, a fact recognized in Lynch, adds 
insult to injury under this critique.438 Thus, the context of religious 
objects does not cure and, in fact, may exacerbate the concerns 
428. Doglin, supra note 11; Feigenson, supra note 407, at 93-101. 
429. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2863 (2005); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 673-78 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983). 
430. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 163 (discussing the existence and 
impact of Christian dominance in American culture and law). 
431. [d. 
432. Karst, supra note 8, at 511-12. 
433. Ravitch, supra note 29, at 567. 
434. [d. at 569. 
435. [d. at 567. 
436. [d. 
437. [d. at 569. 
438. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984). 
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raised by this critique. Like the artificial secularization critique, 
this critique has the vice of often referring to the "message sent" by 
a given religious object. 
C. The Contextual Critique 
This critique suggests that the Court's focus on the physical, 
historical, and/or thematic context of religious objects in religious 
symbolism cases downplays the message sent by the objects 
themselves,439 and often ignores the fact that "nonreligious objects" 
in a given context may reinforce the religious message sent to 
outsiders by the "religious objects." This latter point is shared with 
the majoritarian dominance critique.440 Thus, the message sent to 
non-Christians by the display of a creche with Santa and his 
reindeer is relevant to this critique.441 
In many ways, this critique is a natural corollary to the first two 
critiques since both of those assert that physical context cannot alter 
aspects of the message sent by a religious object.442 Yet the 
contextual critique can stand on its own as well. Central to this 
critique is the idea that the physical context or setting of a patently 
religious object cannot generally alter its meaning for constitutional 
purposes when it is displayed by government.443 Neither can its 
thematic context-that is, the fact that it is connected to the holiday 
season.
444 It is either constitutional to display the object or not, and 
that answer is dependent on the physical or thematic context of the 
object only in the rarest of circumstances.445 A circumstance win 
which the setting of the display should arguably affect outcomes 
under this critique is where a religious object is displayed in specific 
settings, such as in a museum,446 or by a private group in a 
traditional public forum. 447 Thus, this critique by itself is primarily 
439. Zick, supra note 8, at 2367-74; Matthew Paul Kammerer, Note, County 
of Allegheny v. ACLU: Perpetuating the Setting Factor Myth, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 
933, 941-43, 945 (1990). 
440. See supra Part IV.B. 
441. Ravitch, supra note 30, at 569-70. 
442. See supra Parts II, IV.A.-B. 
443. See generally Kammerer, supra note 438 (criticizing the use of physical 
context in the Court's analysis of religious objects). 
444. The Court in Lynch relied heavily on this thematic context to uphold 
the display of the creche in that case. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-81 
(1984). 
445. Kammerer, supra note 439, at 942-43. 
446. This is consistent with O'Connor's discussion of museum paintings in 
her Lynch concurrence. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
447. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62 
(1995). 
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doctrinal,448 but it can involve more theoretical concerns about the 
meaning of objects and symbols and the nature of judicial 
interpretation.449 Along with the first two critiques, the contextual 
critique makes a great deal of sense given theological and 
anthropological views of religious objects and symbols,460 but it 
shares the vice of referring to "messages sent" by religious objects. 
D. The Traditionalism Critique 
This critique questions the Court's use of "longstanding 
tradition" to uphold religious displays by government or on 
government property.451 Lynch is a good example of the Court's use 
of tradition to uphold a government display of a religious object.452 
In Lynch, the Court upheld the display of a creche, at least in part, 
because of the "longstanding tradition" of holiday displays.453 This 
approach is also reflected in the plurality opinion in Van Orden454 
and in some lower court decisions such as Chester County. 455 The 
critique asserts that the Court has never adequately explained why 
such longstanding tradition should affect results in these cases. Nor 
has the Court adequately explained the seeming discrepancies 
between situations where the Court allows such tradition to affect 
outcomes and those where it does not.456 One is reminded of the 
comparisons to Jim Crow in the majoritarian dominance critique 
b 457 a ove. 
If the display of a purely religious object would otherwise be 
unconstitutional, could a longstanding tradition of displaying the 
object make it constitutional? The answer would appear to be no if 
448. The critique is primarily doctrinal in the sense that it often focuses on 
the doctrinal flaws of using physical and thematic context rather than empirical 
or theoretical concerns over the nature of meaning inherent in a contextual 
analysis of this sort. 
449. Zick, supra note 8, at 2368-73 (criticizing focus on context while 
focusing on the meaning of sacred symbols). 
450. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. 
451. See generally Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-85 (suggesting longstanding 
tradition in the United States supports constitutionality of the city's display of 
creche); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (suggesting that tradition 
supports the constitutionality oflegislative prayer). 
452. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-85. 
453. [d. 
454. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
455. See supra notes 366-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Chester 
County case). 
456. Compare Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795 (upholding the "traditional" practice of 
legislative prayer), with Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down the 
practice of prayer at public secondary school graduations). 
457. See supra note 432 and accompanying text. 
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the object is a cross,458 so why should the answer be any different if 
the object is a crechet59 This critique asserts that tradition is at 
most a factor to be considered in determining the context of a 
display. At worst, it is an excuse for upholding displays that would 
never pass constitutional muster otherwise.460 This Article suggests 
that the notion of "longstanding tradition" should play only a 
minimal role in the constitutional analysis of religious objects or 
symbols, unless the tradition being evaluated is the religious 
tradition associated with the object or symbol.461 
V. THE PROBLEM WITH TREATING RELIGIOUS OBJECTS 
AS LEGAL SUBJECTS 
As the above critiques demonstrate, the Court's approach to 
religious objects is devoid of the tools necessary to analyze these 
diverse and often deeply powerful symbols. Contrary to the 
assertions of many of the critics, however, the answer does not lie in 
simply finding a better version of the endorsement test or in 
instituting some other test. The Court has failed in its semiotic task 
so completely that any test used without serious consideration of the 
religious and cultural power often held by religious objects would 
create problems similar to those created by the current doctrine. 
Witness Justice O'Connor's use of the endorsement test in Lynch 
and Allegheny and the criticism thereof.462 Yet, because these 
objects do not have a fixed meaning for all observers, the task of 
deriving meaning from such objects may seem impossible.463 This 
Article asserts that it is not the "meaning" of the object that matters 
most-since meaning is variable--but rather its power.464 
It must be recalled that the Court has essentially analyzed 
religious objects without paying much attention to what counts as a 
religious object or how such objects operate in the lives of believers 
and nonbelievers.465 Moreover, once the Court developed its 
reflexive approach to religious objects, it applied it in a reflexive way 
that was heavily affected by the preconceptions of the Justices466 
458. See supra notes 97,148-76 and accompanying text. 
459. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (upholding the city's 
display of a creche). 
460. Ravitch, supra note 29. 
461. See infra Part V. 
462. Feigenson, supra note 402, at 87-88; Smith, supra note 115. 
463. Dolgin, supra note 11, at 497-98; Feigenson, supra note 406, at 84-86; 
Zick, supra note 8, at 2365-66. 
464. See infra Part VI. 
465. See discussion supra Parts III.A., III.C. (concerning Lynch and 
Allegheny). 
466. Zick, supra note 8, at 2367-74. 
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that were both secularized and Christocentric.467 Of course, there is 
no set meaning for religious symbols, and the Court could never 
create a test that would show what a given object "means" in any 
general sense.468 This is exactly the problem since that is precisely 
what the court has attempted to do.469 The traditional approach 
applied in Van Orden does not solve this problem because it looks to 
the meaning of the object in a given context, and more importantly, 
because it presumes the "traditional" view or use of an object in 
public life supplies its "meaning," at least for legal purposes.470 
While religious objects hold no fIxed meaning for the general 
public, we do know that they hold powerful and profound-even if 
varied-meaning for believers.471 This points to a problem inherent 
in treating religious objects as legal subjects: in order to craft a 
coherent doctrine, the Court is tempted to create a general meaning 
for these objects, but religious objects may hold vastly different 
meaning for both believers and nonbelievers.472 By relying on a more 
secularized meaning as it did in Lynch and Allegheny, the Court 
minimizes the power these objects hold and fails to distinguish 
between objects that are sacred and those that are truly 
I . d 473 secu anze . 
The simple reality of treating religious objects as legal subjects 
is that, short of a bright-line test either prohibiting or permitting 
government to display religious objects, the objects will be distorted 
through the legal lens simply by being subject to the process of legal 
reasoning.474 The only question is how much distortion should be 
tolerated. Before turning to this question it is useful to briefly 
explain why a bright line test is undesirable. 
In Parts II and III of this Article, the array of religious objects 
that have been subjected to legal analysis was cataloged and an 
attempt to categorize the objects was undertaken. It is the diversity 
of this array of objects that militates against a bright-line test either 
permitting or prohibiting their display by government. After all, a 
test that categorically allowed government to display all religious 
symbols would allow, to use Justice Kennedy's famous example, a 
. 
467. See supra Parts IV.A., IV.B. (discussing the secularization and 
majoritarian dominance critiques of the Court's decisions, respectively). 
468. See supra Parts II, IV. 
469. In both Lynch and Allegheny, the Court attempted to find a meaning for 
the religious objects involved based on their context. County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
470. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2862 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
471. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. 
472. Dolgin, supra note 11, at 497-98. 
473. Zick, supra note 8, at 2367-74. 
474. This is implicit in the analysis supra Part II. 
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state government to place a cross on the roof of its capitol.475 Even if 
a dichotomy were drawn between permanent and temporary 
displays, the state would still be allowed to erect crosses on 
government property with taxpayer dollars. While some might find 
this to be unproblematic,476 government use of pure religious 
symbols would go a long way toward promoting the represented 
religion(s). It seems clear that such a situation would fail every test 
the modern Court has used to analyze Establishment Clause cases. 
On the other hand, a strict separationist approach prohibiting 
government from displaying any religious object would prohibit the 
depiction of the Ten Commandments in the frieze on the Supreme 
Court building even though it is surrounded by numerous secular 
objects related to law. If taken to a true extreme, it may prohibit 
religious paintings from hanging in government-funded museums.477 
Even if an exception is made for art in museums, the failure to 
distinguish between religious objects and secularized objects with 
some tangential connection to religion might be problematic. For 
example, even if the display of a Santa and a Christmas tree should 
be unconstitutional,478 what about a display of "jingle bells" without 
either of the aforementioned icons of Christmas? 
As the analysis in the next part suggests, given a choice 
between the two bright-line approaches, the separationist approach 
may be better because it appears more protective of religious 
outsiders while allowing private display of religious symbolism to 
thrive, but it is still a very blunt instrument for dealing with a 
complex phenomenon. This is why a middle ground is better. The 
problem is that while the Court was correct to consider the context 
of religious displays as a variable through which to analyze specific 
religious objects in those displays, it never adequately analyzed the 
objects themselves, in essence making context a determinative 
variable regardless of what was supposedly being contextualized by 
the physical setting. This is highly problematic and not a terribly 
well-informed middle ground. 
The next part of this Article will propose using the facilitation 
test, which I have proposed elsewhere,479 in religious symbolism 
cases. Regardless of the test adopted, however, it is necessary to 
475. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
476. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
477. Of course, as Justice O'Connor has pointed out, such museum displays 
should generally be constitutional. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
478. See discussion infra Part VI. 
479. Ravitch, supra note 30, at 544-58. 
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seriously consider the place of a given religious object in relevant 
religious traditions, as well as its impact on religious outsiders. 
With the exception of "pure religious objects," this consideration will 
not be determinative, and some legal test will need to be applied; 
thus, some distortion of the religious object when it becomes a legal 
subject is bound to occur. Given the seeming dominance of both 
secularized and Christocentric traditions among the Justices and 
judges engaging in this analysis, it would also be useful if the 
applicable test included elements that reign in the Justices' own 
prepossessions, to use Justice Jackson's famous terminology,480 or, to 
use Hans George Gadamer's terminology, their own 
t · 481 preconcep IOns. 
By carefully considering the nature of the object being analyzed, 
the impact of judicial preconceptions can be countered as they come 
into contact with the horizon of the object, to use Gadamer's 
terminology, even if these preconceptions ultimately play into the 
analysis under a given legal test.4B2 If a court first decides that an 
object is a pure religious object because it is used in ritual, 
represents an important theological meaning, or is an object of 
veneration, it would be much harder to justify government display of 
the object in terms that suggest it is passive and desacrilized by its 
context.483 A Justice or judge confronting such a situation would 
have to explain why government display of such an object is or is not 
constitutional given its religious and cultural power. The context of 
the object would still be relevant, but the court, having 
acknowledged the power and role of the object for believers, would 
have to carefully explain how the context of the object could 
desacrilize it adequately so that its display by government does not 
facilitate religion. A purely reflexive jurisprudence such as that in 
Lynch would work poorly here; although, perhaps, that is to be 
expected.484 
It is important to clarify the role of meaning and context in this 
analysis. Both context and meaning are relevant to the equation, 
480. Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
481. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
482. See Frank S. Ravitch, Struggling With Text and Context: A Hermeneutic 
Approach to Interpreting and Realizing Law School Missions, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REV. 731, 734-44 (2000) (discussing the process of interpretation in Gadamerian 
theory). 
483. See supra Part II. 
484. This is to be expected because, unless the court looks more carefully at 
the objects being analyzed in the religious symbolism cases, the Justices are 
bound to integrate their preconceptions into the process of interpreting the 
context of those objects. See supra notes 16, 52-55 and accompanying text. 
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but neither can dictate outcomes because both are inherently 
indeterminate. Context can involve a number of factors such as 
physical proximity, and the framing and interpretation of the 
context of religious objects is not terribly useful without considering 
the objects themselves. The meaning of a religious object is also 
variable depending on who perceives it. Yet we do know that 
religious objects have powerful, even if varied, meaning for 
believers, and it is this power that makes government interaction 
with the objects so problematic. While the context of an object may 
limit this power vis-a.-vis government-for example, where a 
religious painting is displayed in a public museum or a Buddhist 
Bell donated by Japan is displayed in a town that was involved in 
the development of nuclear weapons485-the context does not operate 
in a vacuum. The object itself must be analyzed to see what is being 
contextualized. Thus, while the context and meaning held by an 
object may be relevant variables, it is the power of the religious 
object that is key. 
An obvious retort to this approach would be that by choosing 
the power an object may hold for believers as an important reference 
point, the approach does make meaning somewhat determinative. 
The response to this is "abs9Iutely." The reason these objects are so 
highly contested is precisely because they are "religious" or argued 
to be so. Thus, looking at the religious aspects of religious objects, 
even if they vary, seems a logical first step in evaluating the 
constitutionality of displaying such objects. This does not require an 
assertion that objects have specific meaning that is fixed, but rather 
that some religious objects are imbued for believers with a great 
deal of spiritual meaning and power. The specific "meaning" of the 
object may vary even for believers depending on their 
preconceptions, but the connection between the real world and the 
divine inheres in the object for the believer. Once the religious 
aspects of the object are addressed, the context of the object can be 
considered. Thus, when the object displayed is tied to the dominant 
faith in a given area, its display by government is especially suspect 
since the power of the object is particularly salient in such a context. 
Significantly, there is one type of religious object case in which a 
categorical rule can come close to working. In situations in which 
religious objects are displayed by private parties in a public forum 
that shows no favoritism toward religion or a particular religion, the 
general rule should be in keeping with Capitol Square Review & 
Advisory Board v. Pinette.486 As will be explained in the next section, 
485. Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259, 265 (6th Cir. 2000). 
486. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 
(1995). See also supra notes 128-47 and accompanying text. 
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the reason for this is that such displays will rarely substantially 
facilitate religion.487 Still, this should not be an absolute rule, as it 
was in the plurality opinion in Capitol Square Review & Advisory 
Board, because it is conceivable that a forum could be so overcome 
by religious symbols from one or a few religions that religion could 
be substantially facilitated.488 This will not, however, be the usual 
situation.489 Significantly, any argument by a government entity 
that its own display of a religious object is protected as free speech 
should fail even if government presents itself as an identified 
speaker in a public forum. When government displays religious 
objects, there is no serious way to counter the government 
endorsement (with a small "e") of the religious object.49o 
VI. THE FACILITATION TEST AND RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM 
I have described the basics of the facilitation test elsewhere.491 
Thus, this part will provide an overview of that test and an in-depth 
discussion of its application in religious symbolism cases. Under the 
facilitation test, government action that substantially facilitates or 
discourages religion violates the Establishment Clause. 
Significantly, the facilitation test focuses heavily on the effects of 
government action. The government's purpose is only relevant 
when there is relatively clear evidence of intent to favor or 
discriminate against religion.492 
Facilitation is not the same thing as support. One can provide 
attenuated support for something without facilitating it.493 
Facilitation is about furthering the religious activities of a program 
or entity or about furthering religious practice or the stature of a 
given religion or of religion generally. Moreover, the facilitation test 
requires that the facilitation be substantial to be actionable. 
Substantial facilitation is more than simply giving some minor 
support to a religious institution-it is not a strict separationist 
487. See infra Part VI. 
488. Id. 
489. Id. 
490. Cf Wasserman, supra note 83, at 390-91 (suggesting difficulty of 
engaging in effective counter speech when responding to powerful symbols). 
491. Ravitch, supra note 30, at 544-58. 
492. The evolution of the display in McCreary County would be a good 
example of such intent. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2723-24 
(2005). The behavior of former Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy 
Moore would also be a good example. See supra notes 323-32 and accompanying 
text. 
493. "Facilitate" is defined as "to make easier; help bring about," MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY (1994), and to "ease a process." THE OXFORD DESK 
DICTIONARY (1995). 
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concept. It is a balancing approach that relies on several narrow 
principles.494 Significantly, substantiality is tied to the government 
action-i.e., whether a substantial effect of the action is to facilitate 
1·· 495 re Iglon. 
The facilitation test will not provide bright-line answers in some 
contexts, but it might in others. Bright-line answers, however, are 
not the primary goal of the facilitation test. Rather, as I have stated 
elsewhere, reasonable consistency is the most that can be 
expected.496 Any test that arises in the Establishment Clause 
context must function in a space where thousands of religious 
traditions thrive among hundreds of millions of people in a complex 
regulatory state. This is why the facilitation test focuses on the real 
world impact of government action. Such a focus is necessary given 
the massive web of government activities and programs in the 
modern regulatory state. Moreover, the facilitation test is based on 
the notion espoused by many scholars and jurists that religion is 
constitutionally special or different (this does not always inure to 
the benefit of religious entities). Therefore, religious entities and 
exercises should only be treated the same as nonreligious entities 
and exercises when treating them differently would substantially 
discourage religion and where treating them the same would not 
cause government to substantially facilitate religion. 
I do not suggest that the facilitation test is determinate in the 
sense that notions of formal neutrality or strict separation claim 
determinacy. There is no universal principal of facilitation that can 
be automatically applied to varied factual contexts to yield 
consistent results. Underlying the test is a narrow view of 
separation-which mandates that government cannot facilitate the 
religious mission of religious institutions or enhance the stature of 
religion vis-a.-vis irreligion or of a specific religion(s)-and a narrow 
view of accommodation-which requires that government not 
discourage religion, but must allow religious organizations equal 
access to public forums. The focus on separation recognizes that the 
United States is a nation with exceptional religious diversity and 
that many people within our diverse nation may be affected when 
government engages with religion to the point that it substantially 
facilitates religion or a specific religion. At the same time, the focus 
on accommodation reflects the idea that we are generally "a 
religious people,)497 even if many citizens are not, and thus if 
government excludes or discriminates against religion or religious 
494. Ravitch, supra note 30, at 544-47. 
495. [d. at 548. 
496. [d. at 548-49. 
497. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
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entities in our complex regulatory state, it may substantially 
discourage religion (which also violates the facilitation test). 
Whether a government favors or discriminates against religion to a 
degree that violates the facilitation test can only be determined by 
looking at the nature and effects of the government action involved 
in a given case. 
Thus, in attempting to minimize government encouragement or 
discouragement of religion, the facilitation test recognizes that as a 
practical matter, any choice will to some extent encourage or 
discourage religion, but as Professor Douglas Laycock has argued, 
the goal must be to mInImize the encouragement and 
discouragement of religion, not to make it nonexistent. 4gB The 
substantiality requirement in the facilitation test is meant to help 
provide balance here. If the government action in question 
substantially facilitates the religious mission or status of a religion, 
religious individual, or religious organization, it encourages religion 
and conflicts with the separation principle. Moreover, allowing such 
substantial facilitation cannot be said to simply accommodate 
religion because religion would be receiving an important benefit 
from government, be it material or symbolic. Conversely, if the 
facilitation is not substantial, it is more likely that religion is not 
being encouraged. Thus, allowing the government action is less 
likely to conflict with the separation principle. 
As will be seen, the display of religious symbols is very much 
connected to the question of whether a given display is a private 
display in a public forum or something else.499 Lynch and Allegheny 
(the menorah portion) would have come out differently under the 
facilitation test, but most other symbolism cases, including 
McCreary County and Van Orden, would likely have come out the 
same way, albeit for reasons different from those stated in the 
OpInIOns. The facilitation test uses some aspects of the Court's 
approach, such as the relevance of physical and thematic context, 
but context plays quite a different, and more narrow, role than it did 
in Lynch and Allegheny.50o 
The facilitation test rejects the endorsement test but retains 
some of its aspects. A number of reasons for rejecting the 
endorsement test, at least as it is applied by Justice O'Connor, have 
498. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality 
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1004 (1990) ("Absolute zero is no more 
attainable in encouragement and discouragement than in temperature. We can 
aspire only to minimize encouragement and discouragement."). 
499. See generally Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 
U.S. 753 (1995) (showing that free speech concerns arise when private entities 
display objects in public forum). 
500. Ravitch, supra note 30, at 566-70. 
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been set forth by others and thus need not be repeated in detail 
here.50l Given the multiple meanings that religious objects can hold 
and the powerful meaning they can hold for believers, a test that 
focuses on the perception of objects will ultimately be incoherent. 
Whose perspective will governt02 Whether we go with religious 
outsiders or insiders could yield quite different answers, and, given 
the nature of religious objects, there may be no possible "reasonable 
person" to try to rely upon in analyzing a religious object.503 More 
importantly, the notion that objects can project meaning is an 
inaccurate depiction of the interpretive process. As noted above, 
objects hold meaning that can be fleshed out when an observer 
interacts with an object.504 Thus, the observer's preconceptions play 
a role in the message an object holds for that observer. Yet the 
horizon of the objects, the array of information that is known about 
the objects for those within given traditions, does act as a 
constraining force on the potential meaning an observer may derive 
f h 605 rom tern. 
Government display of religious objects is problematic in part 
because the government is giving added attention to the religious 
tradition(s) reflected in the display. It is the government's conduct 
vis-a-vis the object, not religion generally, that tends to favor 
religion by facilitating it.506 Unlike the endorsement test, the 
facilitation test is not directly concerned with the effect of 
government actions on reasonable observers. Still, a government 
action that substantially facilitates religion is likely to result in a 
perception of endorsement by observers, but whether it does or does 
not will not alter the conclusion that such an action would be 
t 't t' I 507 uncons 1 u lOna . 
Additionally, the facilitation test generally rejects looking at 
legislative purposes given the problems with determining the 
purpose of a broad group of individuals acting as a legislative body. 
501. Feigenson, supra note 407, at 83-93. 
502. Id. at 84. 
503. Id. at 87-88; Smith, supra note 116, at 292-93. 
504. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
505. Id. 
506. For example, despite the court's argument in King County, discussed 
supra at notes 316-323 and accompanying text, the county seal involved in that 
case may have endorsed religion over irreligion because it included the Ten 
Commandments symbol, but given the other factors considered by the Eleventh 
Circuit, such as the absence of the text of the Ten Commandments and the 
county's limited use of the seal, the seal would not substantially facilitate 
religion. Yet if the seal were widely used, or contained the text of the 
commandments, it would most likely substantially facilitate religion. 
507. Ravitch, supra note 30, at 569-70. 
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It does, however, allow a purpose analysis in situations where a 
government actor, including a legislature, demonstrates a clear 
purpose to favor religion. An example of such a situation is provided 
by the troubling behavior of former Alabama Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Roy Moore discussed in Glassroth v. Moore. 50s 
Under the facilitation test, most government displays of pure or 
multifaceted religious objects that give special attention or 
recognition to a religious holiday or a given theology substantially 
facilitate religion; through such expression, government gives the 
specified religion (or religion in general), a special place in the public 
consciousness.509 The effect of such a display gives added attention 
to the religion whose symbol is being displayed. As will be seen, 
government display of secularized religious objects does not 
generally violate the facilitation test, but it can in some 
circumstances. 
A. The Facilitation Test and Pure Religious Objects 
The situation presented in Lynch v. Donnelly is an easy one to 
analyze under the facilitation test.510 The creche at issue in Lynch is 
a pure religious object, and to non-Christians and devout Christians 
alike, a few plastic reindeer and other plastic figures reflecting the 
Christmas holiday cannot adequately (if at all) dilute the special 
recognition given to Christmas and the birth of Jesus, which 
Christmas celebrates.511 Christmas, whether celebrated in its 
commercialized form or as a religious holiday, is simply not a 
holiday celebrated by many non-Christians. Thus, the government 
display of a creche during the Christmas season, regardless of the 
context of that religious object, inherently gives special attention 
and recognition to the holiday and beliefs of a single religion, and 
therefore substantially facilitates religion. 
The same would be true of a government display of a cross.612 
Like a creche, a cross is a pure religious object and government 
display of this object gives special attention to the dominant 
Christian faith.513 There is no secular impact in a cross display. In 
508. 335 F.3d 1282, 1284-86 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining how former Chief 
Justice Moore installed a massive stone tablet of the Ten Commandments in a 
central location in the courthouse in the middle of the night without informing 
the other justices and with a film crew from Coral Ridge Ministries). For 
further discussion of this case, see supra Part III.D. 
509. This is irrespective of whether that special place is perceived by a given 
member or members of the public as "endorsement." 
510. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). 
511. Braveman, supra note 44, at 368-74. 
512. See supra Part I1LB. (discussing cases involving crosses). 
513. Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 
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fact, even when such displays have been categorized as war 
memorials, courts have quite logically pointed out that using the 
cross as a memorial suggests that only Christian war casualties are 
being represented.5i4 This raises other constitutional concerns in 
addition to the Establishment Clause concerns.515 The cross is 
theologically significant, and for some Christian sects, it is both an 
object used in ritual and an object ofveneration.5i6 It is a sectarian, 
pure religious object, and its display by government substantially 
facilitates religion by calling special attention and giving special 
approval to Christianity (or a specific Christian sect depending on 
the type of cross). It is this special attention, rather than how that 
attention is perceived by a hypothetical observer, that violates the 
facilitation test. 
A menorah is also a religious object for purposes of the 
facilitation test.517 The menorah is an object used in religious rituals 
and it has theological meaning.5is Government display of the 
menorah gives special recognition to the holiday of Chanukah and 
may give special recognition to both Jewish and Christian religious 
traditions when the menorah is combined with Christmas 
decorations, such as Christmas trees.5i9 The fact that Chanukah is a 
minor Jewish holiday does not alter the fact that government is 
calling special attention and giving its "endorsement" to that 
holiday. Moreover, the fact that Judaism is not a dominant religion 
is beside the point since government can give special attention to, or 
be favorably disposed to, minority as well as dominant religious 
traditions; in essence, government might be demonstrating that 
some religious minorities are more equal than others.52o While it is 
refreshing to see government pay special attention to a non-
Christian minority religion like Judaism, this does not make the 
government display constitutional. 
The special attention or recognition requirement would not be 
met, however, by a religious painting in a museum; in such a 
620 (9th Cir. 1996). 
514. [d.; see also cases cited supra at Part III.B. 
515. I am referring, of course, to possible concerns under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
516. Separation of Church & State Comm., 93 F.3d at 620. 
517. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 633-34 (1989) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 643 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
518. [d. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
519. [d. at 639-46 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
520. Think of the message that a large Christmas tree, a menorah, and a 
sign saluting liberty outside of a government building might send to a Muslim 
citizen in the current political climate. 
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setting, the recognition given to religion is reduced by the context of 
the display. Religion is not substantially facilitated. Yet if the same 
painting were hung in the main hall of the state capitol building 
(not as part of a larger exhibit), the situation might be different.521 
The nature of the object is more important than its physical context 
in determining how far this analysis would go, but this shows that 
context may remain relevant for pure religious objects in limited 
circumstances. 
Displaying pure religious objects calls special attention to, or 
gives special recognition to, a religious holiday or a specific religion 
or religions. By maintaining such displays on government property, 
the government is speaking religiously.522 When it does so in a 
fashion that supports religion generally or a specific religion, the 
favored religion(s) gain a substantial forum in the public 
consciousness. Unlike the endorsement test, the facilitation test 
rejects the notion that government displays of pure religious objects 
in situations like those in Lynch or Allegheny can ever be 
constitutional, because by their very nature such displays reinforce 
the religion(s) whose objects are displayed. This is not meant to 
minimize the potential conclusion under the endorsement test that 
the display of such objects may reinforce those whose faith is 
favored or alienate those whose faith is left out.523 It simply 
acknowledges that such feelings are the likely byproduct of 
government engaging in actions that support a specific religion or 
religions. It is the support that violates the facilitation test, not the 
response of those who view the support, to the extent the two can be 
detached. 
For this reason some, but not all, multifaceted (and even some 
521. Questions about why that painting was chosen would also be relevant, 
thus reintroducing a limited purpose analysis (to detenhine if the decision was 
made to favor a particular faith or religion generally). For example, consider 
the difference between a mural of the Ten Commandments exhibited as part of 
a broader display of art in a public art museum and the actions of the current 
chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court. Former Chief Justice Moore, who 
is known as the "Ten Commandments" Justice, snuck a large stone engraving of 
the Ten Commandments into the Supreme Court building in the middle of the 
night without consulting his fellow justices. The large stone monument was 
displayed prominently in the courthouse, and fonner Chief Justice Moore 
refused to allow other displays to receive similarly prominent attention. See 
Manuel Roig-Franzia, Biblical Display in Court Rejected, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 
2002, at 10. 
522. See generally E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks 
Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183 (1994). 
523. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597-98, 601-02, 605, 612-
13 (1989); id. at 625-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 650-51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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secularized) religious objects may not be displayed by government. 
When such objects are involved, however, context becomes an 
important factor. Thus, government display of some, but not all, 
Ten Commandments monuments is unconstitutional. 
B. The Facilitation Test and Multifaceted and Secularized 
Religious Objects 
Ten Commandments· displays are the hardest to analyze under 
the facilitation test because they are highly multifaceted objects. 
Putting aside cases like Glassroth v. Moore ,524 in which the 
government actor acts in complete disregard of the beliefs and 
emotions of religious· outsiders and even the most basic 
constitutional norms long recognized by the Court under the 
Establishment Clause, Ten Commandments display cases are hard 
cases. If all that is displayed on a large monument is the Ten 
Commandments, including the text of the Commandments, the 
display would most likely violate the facilitation test because the 
government display of such an object would call special attention to 
the theological meaning and power the object holds. Yet if the 
display is much smaller or involves other motifs, the situation might 
be different .. 
Under the facilitation test, we are not concerned with the 
message such a display "sends" to insiders or outsiders, but rather 
with the attention the government display gives religion or a specific 
religion(s). The potential meaning the object holds for insiders and 
outsiders is part of this equation, but it is not the entire equation.525 
One problem with Ten Commandments monuments that include the 
text of the Commandments is that the Jewish, Protestant, and 
Roman Catholic texts vary (and there are variations among different 
Protestant traditions). 526 Thus, any attempt to make the text the 
centerpiece of a display would give special recognition to a specific 
religion. Under this analysis government display of the monuments 
created by the Fraternal Order of Eagles, which were involved in a 
number of cases, would be unconstitutional.527 This is consistent 
524. 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.2003). 
525. Cf Ravitch, supra note 29, at 570 (stating that feelings of endorsement 
"are the likely by-product of government engaging in actions that support a 
specific religion or religions. It is the support that violates the facilitation test, 
not the response of those who view the support .... "). 
526. Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and 
Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1478-79 (2005); Steven Lubet, The Ten 
Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 471, 474-76 (1998). 
527. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2873 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see supra Part· III.D. (including the discussion of five cases 
involving Ten Commandments monuments donated to local governments by the 
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with the outcomes, if not the reasoning, in most of these cases.528 At 
best these monuments, which were designed to be sensitive to 
Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews,529 call special recognition to 
the three major Western religious traditions in the United States. 
Other displays might survive the facilitation test. A monument 
to law that included the Commandments as part of a broader motif, 
especially without the text of the Commandments, would be 
constitutional so long as the Commandments (and religious texts 
generally) did not have a disproportionate place in the monument 
and there was some logical and supportable connection between the 
Commandments and the other objects displayed.530 There would be 
no duty to exclude the Commandments from such a monument 
simply because they are of religious origin because, in context (and 
here context matters), religion is not given special recognition or 
approval by government since the Ten Commandments can 
represent the religious roots of some Western legal norms.531 
Similarly, the seal in King v. Richmond Countl32 and the small 
plaque in Freethought Society v. Chester County,533 would be 
constitutional under the facilitation test. The former would be 
constitutional because it did not include the text of the 
Commandments and, in context, the Commandments icon does little 
to give religion substantial special recognition.534 The latter would 
be constitutional because the plaque was not moved when the 
entrance to the courthouse was moved, and because it is not visible 
Fraternal Order of Eagles). 
528. ACLU Nebraska Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020,1024-25, 
1042 (8th Cir. 2004), rehearing granted en banc & opinion vacated, No. 02-2444, 
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the City violated the 
Establishment Clause by displaying a Ten Commandments monument donated 
by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1965 in a city park); Adland v. Russ, 307 
F.3d 471, 475 (6th Cir. 2002) (striking down a display on the grounds of the 
State Capitol of a monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1961); 
Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292,294-95 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding the same 
for monument donated in 1958 and located on the grounds of a City municipal 
building). 
529. Books, 235 F.3d at 294. 
530. ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 447-54 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. 
granted, 125 S. Ct. 310 (2004). 
531. Adland, 307 F.3d at 489-90. 
532. 331 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003); see discussion, supra Part III.D. 
533. 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003); see discussion, supra Part III.D. 
534. King, 331 F.3d at 1283-86. While the King court relied on the context 
and makeup of the seal to uphold its use under the Lemon and endorsement 
tests, id., some of the factors the court relied upon, especially the fact that the 
text of the Commandments was not included on the seal, would also be relevant 
to analysis under the facilitation test. 
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from the street.535 Given its location, the plaque does not give 
special recognition to religion.536 Had the entrance not been moved 
the situation would be different. 
McCreary County would be the easier of the two recent Ten 
Commandments cases under the facilitation test. The facts in that 
case suggest that it is one of the few cases where purpose would be 
adequate to find government action unconstitutional. As the 
majority opinion points out, the pattern of behavior evidenced by the 
counties makes clear that their. purpose was to post the Ten 
Commandments in some form, and preferably a form that most 
stressed their religious significance.537 Such a purpose is intended to 
facilitate religion, specifically Protestant religion since the King 
J ames version was used. When state actors act with the goal of 
facilitating religion, the attempt itself substantially facilitates 
religion because a government entity-and here the facilitation test 
would mirror the majority opinion-is taking sides regarding 
1·· 538 re 19Ion. 
Van Orden would be a much harder case under the facilitation 
test. It is clear that the posting of a Ten Commandments monument 
on government property facilitates religion, but does it substantially 
facilitate religion? As mentioned above, this is where context may 
become more relevant. The facilitation test would give no 
recognition to the longstanding traditions the plurality and Justice 
Breyer cite539 because most of those traditions have little to do with 
the question of posting a sectarian text (even if it is claimed to be 
multisectarian) on government property.540 Yet simply finding that 
the posting of such a text on state property violates the principle of 
separation of church and state and thus the Establishment Clause is 
535. Freethought Soc'y, 334 F.3d at 253-54. The court did consider these 
factors in its analysis under the Lemon and endorsement tests, but these factors 
would take on a more important role under the facilitation test because they go 
directly to whether the government is calling special attention or giving special 
recognition to religion or a religion. 
536. The court noted: 
To read the text of the Commandments, it is necessary to climb the 
steps leading to the historic entrance . . .. But since this entrance 
was closed in 2001 for security reasons and to cut costs ... , and the 
new entrance is located further north along the sidewalk, there is no 
reason for a visitor to the courthouse to climb these steps. 
[d. at 253-54. 
537. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2738-41 (2005). 
538. [d. at 2742-44. 
539. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
540. [d. at 2882-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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inadequate as wel1.541 Certainly separation is a relevant principle in 
the analysis, but absent substantial facilitation, there should be no 
problem under the separation principle as used in the facilitation 
test.542 Given the location of the monument and the many other 
monuments in the area, it would be hard to say that religion is 
substantially facilitated by the monument. Although it might be 
argued that the monument calls additional attention to religion, it 
does not call substantial attention to it in context. This is a close 
case, but given the facts of the case, the Texas monument would not 
violate the facilitation test. If the same monument were placed in 
front of a municipal building, courthouse, or even directly in front of 
a state capitol,543 the answer would be different because substantial 
attention would be called to the monument and the text of the 
Commandments. The same was simply not true in Van Orden, 
given the Texas monument's location vis-a-vis the nearby buildings 
on the huge Capitol grounds.544 
A Christmas tree is a symbol of Christmas. Yet a Christmas 
tree is not a pure religious object. Rather, it is either a multifaceted 
or secularized object, given the role it plays in the modern 
Christmas season, the fact that most people are unaware of its 
connection to Christian theology, and its absence from Christmas 
celebrations until roughly the Reformation (and scattered use after 
that). 545 According to the Court, a Christmas tree is not a symbol of 
a purely religious holiday, but rather of a nationally recognized 
holiday with religious meaning for some and religious roots. 546 The 
Court's decisions in this regard have been soundly criticized both 
because of the Court's characterization of the holiday and because of 
its characterization of the objects related to that holiday.547 Simply 
put, Christmas is not a secular holiday nor is it a truly national 
holiday for Americans who do not share the dominant Christian 
faith or tradition. If Christmas were a "public" holiday and a 
Christmas tree were a completely secularized object, it would be 
more likely that those who practice other faiths would be willing to 
541. [d. at 2874-77. 
542. Ravitch, supra note 30, at 547-48. 
543. See cases discussed supra notes 324-91 and accompanying text. 
544. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (plurality opinion). 
545. For an interesting discussion of the history of Christmas trees from 
their earliest known uses in Germany in the late 1500s to today, see TRISTRAM 
POTTER COFFIN, THE BOOK OF CHRISTMAS FOLKLORE 19-21 (1973); PENNE L. 
RESTAD, CHRISTMAS IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 57-74 (1995); PHILLlPV. SNYDER, THE 
CHRISTMAS TREE BOOK: THE HISTORY OF THE CHRISTMAS TREE AND ANTIQUE 
CHRISTMAS TREE ORNAMENTS 11-39 (1976). 
546. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 662-63 (1989). 
547. See supra Part IV. 
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have one. Yet a devout Jew, Muslim, Hindu, or other non-Christian 
would be unlikely to have a Christmas tree since Christmas is 
neither a Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist holiday, nor is it 
considered a "public" holiday by many Atheists. The irony that it is 
called a Christmas (or Christ's Mass) tree rather than a winter tree 
or holiday tree, seemed lost on the Court in Allegheny.548 
Thus, a Christmas tree, which is associated only with the 
Christian holiday of Christmas, cannot be considered 
nondenominational just because that holiday has taken on a 
commercial aspect as well. The fact, relied upon by the Lynch 
majority, that "official announcements" of Congress have declared 
Christmas a national holidal49 are not determinative because 
Congress' announcements in this regard would be unconstitutional 
under the facilitation test. It would be acceptable under that test for 
Congress to close all nonessential government operations because of 
the likelihood and administrative reality that many people will take 
the day off. 
It is, however, accurate to say that a Christmas tree is currently 
a secularized symbol of a religious holiday for many Americans.550 
Yet it is significant that it remains a symbol of that holiday and 
thus integrally connected to the dominant religion in the United 
States. The same could be said of Santa Claus, the common name 
for St. Nicholas, a religious figure. 55! While a celebration of the 
Saint himself would have serious religious connotations, the modern 
persona of Santa Claus is, much like the Christmas tree, a 
potentially secularized symbol of a religious holiday.552 Children in 
practicing religious minority families do not generally get visits from 
Santa, and, in fact, the Christmas season can be a very trying time 
for such children. 553 
The question remains, would a government display of 
Christmas trees and Santa Claus violate the facilitation test? There 
is no question that display of these icons of Christmas facilitates 
religion by calling continued attention to the holiday. The question 
is whether it "substantially" facilitates religion. To determine this 
we must look to the objects themselves. The objects are certainly 
connected to the holiday of Christmas, but they do not have the 
548. See generally Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573. 
549. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,676 (1984). 
550. See supra note 539 and accompanying text. 
551. RESTAD, note 540, at 45. 
552. Kent Greenawalt has astutely used the term «Ambiguous Symbols" to 
describe such objects. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in 
Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 794-95 (1984). 
553. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 163 (discussing existence and 
impact of Christian dominance in American culture and law). 
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same theological significance as a pure religious object or even a Ten 
Commandments monument. Over time they have become somewhat 
secularized,554 but not nondenominational. These objects don't hold 
the same religious power that pure religious objects hold, but they 
are a powerful signal of a major holiday celebrated by the dominant 
religion in the United States. When the government displays these 
objects, it calls attention to Christmas, but not necessarily to the 
theological implications of Christmas. Interestingly, religious 
minorities might be more likely to see these objects as substantially 
facilitating religion than Christians.555 The facilitation test, 
however, is concerned with the object and not with the task of 
deciding among such perceptions. Given the minimal theological 
significance of a Christmas tree or Santa Claus, these objects can 
generally be displayed by the government along with snowflakes, 
candy canes, and other objects connected to the winter season, but 
because they remain secularized religious objects, the context of the 
display is quite relevant to this analysis. 
Most governmental holiday displays that include objects closely 
affiliated with Christmas, such as Christmas trees and Santas, 
along with secular objects, such as snowflakes and snowmen, would 
not violate the facilitation test without some connection to the 
religious aspects of the holidays. Such displays call attention to 
Christmas, but they do not substantially facilitate the religious 
nature of that holiday. Yet a display that only included symbols of 
Christmas, such as Christmas trees and Santas, could violate the 
facilitation test under limited circumstances despite the lack of pure 
religious objects if such displays add government's powerful voice to 
the already overwhelming cacophony of voices giving special 
attention and support for the Christmas season as opposed to the 
winter season. This is so despite the fact that some of the objects 
involved are not pure or even multifaceted religious objects. 
Perhaps the best example of such a display (or event, rather) is 
the lighting of the White House Christmas tree by the President, an 
event in which the leader of the nation formally lights an object that 
represents a major holiday of the nation's dominant religion. This 
gives special attention or recognition to that holiday in a significant 
way. A future non-Christian President who refuses to have or light 
the White House Christmas tree might suffer politically, and the 
failure to light the "traditional" tree might cause a good deal of 
controversy. Of course, while the President lighting the tree, as well 
554. See supra note 545 and accompanying text. 
555. Cf Feldman, supra note 163 (explaining how the power differential 
between dominant religious traditions and religious outgroups can affect how 
each perceives government support of religious traditions). 
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as some other governmental Christmas displays, violate the 
facilitation test, challenging these displays is a battle from which 
one might wisely abstain.556 Significantly, displays that are focused 
on winter, but which also have elements that some associate with 
Christmas such as jingle bells or candy canes, would not even raise 
a question under the facilitation test; government would be free to 
create such displays.557 
Finally, when private entities display religious objects in a 
public forum, religion is rarely substantially facilitated. 558 The only 
exceptions occur where government gives favored access to or 
otherwise favors particular religious objects or religious objects 
generally, or where a forum is so dominated by religious objects of a 
given religion that the fact it is government property could suggest 
government is giving special recognition to a specific religion. Such 
will rarely be the case in a public forum. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
When religious objects become the subject of litigation, they 
become legal subjects. As such, the lens of the law has had a 
tendency to significantly distort their nature and impact. This is 
evidenced by the almost deafening criticism of the Court's religious 
symbolism cases. This need not be the case. If courts took greater 
care in analyzing the objects at the center of religious symbolism 
cases, they might be able to develop a less reflexive legal doctrine. A 
doctrine that values and integrates the religious aspects of religious 
objects would be less reflexive. This might cause some displays 
apparently favored by many judges to be found unconstitutional, but 
it would help prevent the legal lens from desacrilizing deeply 
religious objects and ignoring the power they hold for believers and 
556. It is important to note that a particular government action may violate 
the Establishment Clause, yet it may be unwise to challenge that action 
because it may do more damage than good to the cause of protecting against 
government establishments when the likely public response to the challenge is 
weighed against the benefits of bringing the claim. This may be particularly 
true in situations where the challenged practice is one of ceremonial deism. An 
example might be the recent challenge to the Pledge of Allegiance, where the 
Court had already approved exemptions in West Virginia. State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 
F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds by, Elk Grove Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). The backlash against the Ninth Circuit 
decision striking down the 1954 amendment that added the words "under God" 
to the pledge was intense. Howard Fineman, One Nation, Under . .. Who?, 
NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 20. 
557. Assuming, of course, the displays do not include an object such as a 
creche. 
558. Ravitch, supra note 30, at 570-71. 
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the potentially alienating meaning they may hold for nonbelievers. 
This Article suggests that courts have been dealing with 
different categories of religious objects in the religious symbolism 
cases and that different types of religious objects might warrant a 
different analysis. The Article proposes a test that considers 
whether a government display of a religious object substantially 
facilitates religion. In the end, however, any test the Court uses 
should be sensitive to the nature and variety of the objects it is 
analyzing. Unfortunately, the current doctrine all but ignores such 
issues. 
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